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1. I submitted an opening expert report on behalf of Respondent in this 
matter on July 29, 2016 (the “Dages Report”) in which I present certain analyses 
and opinions, including my opinion that the fair value of Aruba (formerly Aruba 
Networks, Inc.) (“Aruba” or the “Company”), as of May 18, 2015 (the “Valuation 
Date”) was $19.85 per share.
1
  My fair value opinion is based on a 2-stage 
discounted cash flow (“DCF”) model and supported by additional valuation 
analyses and sensitivities. 
2. Paul A. Marcus, the Managing Member of PM Financial Expert 
Consultants, submitted an opening expert report on behalf of Petitioners (the 
“Marcus Report”) in which he offers certain opinions, including the opinion that 
the fair value of Aruba as of the Valuation Date was $32.57 per share.
2
  Mr. 
Marcus’s fair value opinion is based on a three-stage DCF model and he claims the 




                                                          
1. Dages Report, p. 3. 
2. Marcus Report, p. 4. 
3.  Marcus Report, p. 4.  Mr. Marcus states that the comparable company analysis 
“support[s] the result of my DCF valuation.”  This statement, however, is 
contradicted by later opinions in his report.  Mr. Marcus later criticizes the 
comparable company analysis, stating “I therefore, do not rely on this 
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II. ASSIGNMENT AND SUMMARY OF OPINIONS 
3. I have been asked by counsel for Respondent to respond to the 
analyses and opinions proffered in the Marcus Report and to provide the Court 
with a summary and quantification of the key differences between the fair value 
conclusions reached in the Dages and Marcus Reports. 
4. Given the number of areas for potential disagreement, the Dages and 
Marcus Reports are surprisingly aligned on many of the key assumptions 
underlying their respective fair value conclusions.  The fair value conclusions in 
both reports are derived from DCF analyses based on the financial projections 
prepared by Aruba management and presented to the Board on February 2, 2015 
(the “February Projections”).  In addition, both reports recognize that stock-based 
compensation (“SBC”) expense represented a true economic cost for Aruba and, as 
such, should be treated as a cash expense in determining Aruba’s future free cash 
flows.  Both reports use the Gordon growth model to calculate the terminal value 
and the capital asset pricing model (“CAPM”) to estimate the discount rate.  Table 
1 presents a side by side comparison of the key issues in the Dages and Marcus 
Reports that inform their respective fair value conclusions. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
methodology to assist in the determination of Aruba’s fair value” (see ¶239) 
and “…I have not factored this analysis into my assessment of Aruba’s value 
in any way, but view it to be generally consistent with the value that I 
calculated utilizing the DCF valuation method.” (see ¶242). 
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Issue Dages Report Marcus Report 
Value Impact 
of Issue 
Fair Value Conclusion $19.85 Per Share $32.57 Per Share $12.72  
Fair Value Approach Two-Stage DCF Three-Stage DCF $2.16 
Perpetuity Growth Rate 2.75% 3.50% $2.35  
Discount Rate CAPM - 11% CAPM - 10% $3.20  
Risk-free Rate 2.75% 2.75%  $0.00 
Beta Measure 1.33 0.91 
 $6.90 
  
Beta Method Multiple 
2/3 Company and 1/3 
Peer 
Equity Risk Premium Supply Side -6.21% Supply Side -6.19% $0.00 
Size Premium None 5
th
 Decile - 1.60% -$3.70  
SBC Treatment Cash Expense Cash Expense 
$3.55  
SBC Forecast From Barclays From Proxy 
Tax Rate Effective Rate Cash Rate $1.47  
 
As Table 1 illustrates, the main areas of disagreement between the Dages and 
Marcus reports as it relates to the appropriate DCF assumptions are: 
1) whether or not a three-stage DCF model is warranted; 
2) the appropriate growth rate beyond the explicit forecast period; 
                                                          
4.  See Rebuttal Exhibits 6, 8, 9A-B, 10, and 11.  As is always the case with this 
type of comparison, the value impact of any one adjustment will vary 
depending on the order in which the adjustments are made.  The table above 
presents value results based on adjustments to the Marcus model proceeding 
in order from top to bottom ending at a per share value of $19.85. 
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3) the appropriate discount rate; 
4) the appropriate level of SBC expense; and 
5) the appropriate tax rate. 
 
5. Based upon my review and analysis of the Marcus Report, as well as 
the evidence in the record and other publicly-available information, I have formed 
the following principal rebuttal opinions: 
i. Given the dynamics in the enterprise wireless local area network 
(“WLAN”) industry as of the Valuation Date, particularly as it relates 
to the prospects for a pure-play or single product wireless vendor like 
Aruba, a third stage of continued growth is not warranted in a DCF 
analysis and serves to overstate Aruba’s fair value. 
ii. The perpetual growth rate of 3.5 percent (or 4.1 percent assuming a 
two-stage model) assumed by Mr. Marcus is at odds with expectations 
for the enterprise WLAN industry as a whole, as well as Aruba’s 
growth prospects within that industry. 
iii. Mr. Marcus’s 10 percent discount rate is based on numerous flawed 
assumptions and is contradicted by multiple contemporaneous 
estimates in the record. 
iv. The SBC forecast relied on by Mr. Marcus is unreasonable given 
Aruba’s historically elevated SBC expense relative to its peers and the 
significant revenue growth reflected in the February Projections. 
v. Mr. Marcus’s tax rate assumption is unsupported and serves to 
overstate his fair value conclusion. 
vi. The revenue growth and margin expansion in the February Projections 
are at odds with the challenges facing Aruba and the WLAN Industry.  
vii. Mr. Marcus’s comparable company analysis is based on companies 
that are not sufficiently comparable to Aruba and, when corrected, 
fails to support his fair value conclusion. 
viii. Mr. Marcus’s observations regarding comparable transactions and 
what he terms “external checks on valuation” are fundamentally 
flawed and misleading. 
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6. The materials I have relied upon in forming my opinions are listed in 
Appendix A. 
III. MR. MARCUS’S THIRD STAGE IS NOT WARRANTED AND 
SERVES TO OVERSTATE ARUBA’S FAIR VALUE. 
7. In the Dages Report, I consider whether a three-stage DCF analysis is 
warranted in determining the fair value of Aruba and ultimately conclude that it is 
not.
5
  In the remainder of this section, I expand upon the argument against 
including a third stage and illustrate the value attributed to and perpetual growth 
implied by the third stage in Mr. Marcus’s DCF analysis. 
8. According to the Marcus Report, a DCF analysis of Aruba requires 
that the length of time for the projections be extended “to account for the time it 
would take for Aruba’s financial performance to normalize or to achieve a 
relatively level growth rate.”
6
  However, Mr. Marcus points to nothing explicit in 
Aruba’s business plans, such as a particular or significant investment, that requires 
modeling additional growth beyond the forecast period.  Moreover, his stated 
justification seems to suggest that a three-stage model is required any time the 
growth rate in the final year of the forecast is higher than what is determined to be 
                                                          
5.  Dages Report, pp. 41-42. 
6.  Marcus Report, p. 78. 
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a “relatively level growth rate.”
7
  Mr. Marcus’s justification for a third stage is at 
odds with authoritative valuation texts as well as prior rulings from this Court. 
9. In his book, Damodaran on Valuation, Professor Damodaran points to 
three factors that should be considered when determining how long a firm will be 
able to maintain high growth: (1) the size of the firm, (2) the existing growth rate 
and excess returns, and (3) the magnitude and sustainability of competitive 
advantages.
8
   
10. According to Professor Damodaran, small firms in large markets have 
the potential for continued high growth, particularly when they have room to grow 
in increasingly larger markets.  When assessing the size of the firm, Professor 
Damodaran says one should look not only at the firm’s market share but also the 
potential for further growth in the overall market.  In other words, a company with 
a large market share may still have room for high growth if the overall market is 
expected to grow rapidly.
9
  This was not the case for Aruba at the time of the 
transaction.  Not only was the enterprise WLAN industry not expected to continue 
to grow at the rate it had been prior to the Transaction, but Aruba’s market share 
gains had effectively stalled out (largely due to the shifting dynamics in the 
                                                          
7.  Id. 
8.  Damodaran, Ashwath.  Damodaran on Valuation Second Edition.  John Wiley 
& Sons, Inc., 2006.  (“Damodaran on Valuation”), p. 118. 
9.  Id. 
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industry).  With the exception of 2014, a year in which Aruba benefited from a 
partnership with Juniper that yielded a single period share gain, 
10
 Aruba’s market 
share had been relatively flat.  Rebuttal Exhibits 1 and 2 present Aruba’s market 
share from 2008 to 2014 on a quarterly and annual basis, respectively.  The 
exhibits clearly indicate that Aruba’s market share declined from 2011 to 2013 
before recovering in 2014 to its 2011 market share level.  Furthermore, while the 
enterprise WLAN industry grew at a compound annual growth rate (“CAGR”) of 
21% from 2009 to 2014, the average expected growth for the market from 2014 to 
2019 was only 10.2% (see Rebuttal Exhibit 3). 
11. Professor Damodaran’s second factor suggests that firms that are 
growing revenues rapidly are more likely to see that rapid growth continue, at least 
in the near future.  In addition, firms that are experiencing high returns on capital 
(“ROC”)
11
 are more likely to sustain those excess returns.
12
  In Aruba’s case, the 
firm’s revenue grew at 16 percent in 2013 and 21 percent in 2014 (again with the 
assistance of the Juniper partnership).  Those growth rates are projected to continue 
through the near term of the February Projections with 19% revenue growth in 
2015, 2016, and 2017.  In terms of ROC, Aruba rarely had positive operating 
                                                          
10. See Expert Rebuttal Report of Chris DePuy (“DePuy Report”), p. 36. 
11.  ROC = Earnings before interest and taxes (“EBIT”) * (1- tax rate) / Average 
total capital. 
12.  Damodaran on Valuation, p. 118. 
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income or EBIT.  Operating margins (or operating income as a percentage of 
revenue) ranged from a low of negative 13 percent to a high of a positive 2 percent 
in the five years prior to the Transaction ending with an operating margin of 0 
(zero) percent in 2014.
13
  Despite these negative or low single digit historical 
operating margins, the February Projections assume operating margins will reverse 
course and increase dramatically to 11 percent in 2015, while further increasing to 
18 percent in 2019.
14
 
12. Lastly, Professor Damodaran’s third factor, and the one suggested to 
be perhaps most critical in determining how long the high growth period will last, 
is the magnitude and sustainability of a firm’s competitive advantages.  According 
to Professor Damodaran, if a firm’s competitive advantages are fading or there are 
very low barriers to entry, one should be conservative about the length of the high 
growth period.  In Aruba’s case, some of its key competitive advantages were 
believed to be waning at the time of the Transaction.  For example, in a March 25, 
2015 report, Mike Fratto from Current Analysis wrote that Aruba’s competitive 
advantage in security (one of its key product strengths) was “diminishing as many 
WLAN vendors have begun to offer more integrated security functionality.”
15
  In 
                                                          
13.  See Figure 1 below for historical Operating Income. 
14.  Marcus Report, Exhibit 7-2. 
15.  Current Analysis, March 25, 2015, p. 1 (ArubaAA0107306-28 at 06). 
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addition, the bundling advantage held by WLAN Vendors with larger switching 
portfolios put Aruba at a disadvantage with the upgrade cycle to 802.11ac Wave 2 
requiring an upgrade to switches.
16
 
13. Furthermore, Chris DePuy, Respondent’s industry expert, identifies 
several additional challenges facing Aruba at the time of the Transaction including: 
(1) significant exposure (26% of WLAN product revenues) to the WLAN 
controller business – a business whose growth was expected to be flat over next 
five years; (2) a lack of exposure to important growth areas (cloud-managed LAN 
and the China Market); and (3) being late to market with new wireless technology. 
14. At bottom, evaluating Aruba on Professor Damodran’s three criteria 
calls into question Aruba’s ability to achieve the robust revenue growth reflected in 
the February Projections, let alone sustain high growth beyond the explicit five 
year forecast period. 
15. This Court has elected to rely on a three-stage DCF model in specific 
cases where a company had not yet reached a steady state at the end of the forecast 
period.  For example, in its In Re Rural Metro Shareholders Litigation opinion, the 
Court ruled that Rural Metro would not reach a steady state for at least five years 
beyond the forecast period because it would take that long for anticipated 
                                                          
16.  DePuy Report, ¶45. 
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acquisitions to be fully integrated.
17
  Similarly, in In Re Appraisal of Dell, Inc., the 
Court ruled that the “three-stage model better captured the operative reality of the 
Company and the likely schedule for the transformation plan to generate results.”
18
 
In both situations, the Court cited an explicit purpose for the third stage – Rural 
Metro’s planned acquisition integration and Dell’s planned transformation from a 
PC business to an enterprise IT solutions provider.  In contrast, Mr. Marcus does 
not cite any explicit investment or transformation plan as the basis for his third 
stage but simply relies on his own unsupported assertion that Aruba had not yet 
reached steady state. 
16. Furthermore, Mr. Marcus provides no support for arbitrarily reducing 
the growth rate linearly in his final stage.  This Court has previously chosen not to 
adopt arbitrary extrapolations for a third stage noting that they were built off the 
“very optimistic, and least reliable fifth year of the management projections” and 
“extrapolate[ ] new data from already imperfect projections.”
19
 Given the plethora 
of challenges facing Aruba as a stand-alone single product WLAN vendor and the 
significant growth in excess of the industry reflected in the February Projections, 
                                                          
17.  See In re Rural Metro Corp., 88 A.3d 54, 108 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
18 . In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. CV 9322-VCL, 2016 WL 3186538, at *46 
(Del. Ch. May 31, 2016). 
19.  Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc., No. CIV.A. 20289, 2005 WL 2045640, at 
*12-*13 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2005). 
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there is a very strong argument to be made that the February Projections are 
already overly optimistic and that extending that optimism only serves to inject 
further uncertainty into the resulting fair value estimate. 
17. Rebuttal Exhibit 4 presents the 2015-2019 revenue forecasts for the 
overall Wireless LAN industry from independent research firms that track the top 
WLAN vendors’ performance and market shares.  The exhibit also compares the 
various forecasts to the revenue growth rates in the February Projections from 
2015 to 2020.  While there are some small variations between the different 
research firms in terms of what they include in their forecasts, the growth 
trajectories projected are generally aligned and the forecasts indicate a median 
CAGR of 10.2% for the WLAN industry from 2014 to 2019.
20
  In contrast, the 
February Projections suggest that Aruba will grow at a CAGR of 17% from 2015 
to 2019. 
18. Rebuttal Exhibit 5 presents Aruba’s annual historical market share as 
well as its expected market share based on the revenue growth rates reflected in the 
management projections and the median revenue growth forecast for the WLAN 
industry from 2015 to 2019.  The exhibit indicates that the February Projections 
assume an increase in Aruba’s market share from 11.7 percent in 2014 to 15.6 
                                                          
20.  See Rebuttal Exhibit 3. 
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percent in 2019 at the end of the explicit forecast period. 
19. Given the dynamics in the wired and wireless LAN (WLAN) markets 
at the time of the Transaction, it is difficult to imagine a single product vendor 
such as Aruba growing at even the industry growth rate, let alone at rates 
significantly higher than the industry from 2015 to 2019.  In a June 2014 research 
report, Gartner indicated that the access layer market consists of three types of 
vendors: (1) those that provide their own wired and wireless infrastructure 
connectivity, network service applications, and services (such as Cisco and HP 
Networking); (2) those that mainly focus on a specific connectivity option, often 
offering solutions for one or more vertical markets or deployment solutions that 
address a unique set of market requirements (such as Aruba Networks and 
Aerohive); and (3) those that use a strategic partner to provide a portion of the 
access solution (such as Juniper and Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise).
21
  Gartner further 
noted that the market “continues to evolve from two separate decisions, one being 
wired and the other being wireless, to a single unified access layer decision.”
22
 
20. In addition, the robust growth reflected in the February Projections 
should be considered in light of the very real prospect that Aruba would have to 
                                                          
21.  “Magic Quadrant for the Wired and Wireless LAN Access Infrastructure,” 
Gartner, June 26, 2014, p. 1 (ArubaAA0535568-94) at 68. 
22.  Id. 
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deliver those results without its leader.  As I discuss in the Dages Report, at the 
time of the Transaction, Dominic Orr, Aruba’s CEO, was planning to retire and 
that likelihood was not reflected in the February Projections.
23
 
21. Removing the third stage from Mr. Marcus’s analysis, while still 
allowing for growth of 3.5 percent in perpetuity, closes the gap between his fair 
value conclusion and my own.  Rebuttal Exhibit 6 presents a sensitivity of Mr. 
Marcus’s DCF analysis after removing his extrapolated projections for 2021 to 
2025 and assuming Aruba’s free cash flows will grow at 3.5% in perpetuity.  As 
the exhibit illustrates, removing the third stage from Mr. Marcus’s analysis reduces 
his fair value conclusion from $32.57 per share to $30.41 per share.  Rebuttal 
Exhibit 7 replicates the analysis presented in Rebuttal Exhibit 6 but then solves 
for the perpetual growth rate (“PGR”) required if Mr. Marcus were to adopt a two-
stage model and still reach the same fair value conclusion of $32.57 per share.  The 
exhibit indicates that a two-stage version of Mr. Marcus’s DCF analysis would 
require a PGR of 4.1 percent in order to result in a value of $32.57 per share.  This 
result implies that beyond growing in excess of the industry, thereby taking market 
share from its competitors in every single year of the February Projections, Mr. 
Marcus assumes that Aruba will continue to grow at a very high rate in perpetuity.  
                                                          
23.  Dages Report, p. 15. 
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At a minimum, one would expect Mr. Marcus to provide some justification for this 
remarkable growth.  
IV. MR. MARCUS’S PERPETUAL GROWTH RATE OF 3.5 PERCENT 
(OR 4.1 PERCENT ASSUMING A TWO-STAGE MODEL) IS 
UNREASONABLE.   
22. For all of the reasons described above, not only is Mr. Marcus’s third 
stage not warranted but his perpetual growth rate of 3.5 percent (or 4.1 percent 
assuming a 2-stage DCF model) is too high.  It has been recognized by this Court 
that the applicable inflation rate is the “floor for a terminal value estimate for a 
solidly profitable company that does not have an identifiable risk of insolvency.”
24
  
And while there did not appear to be an identifiable risk of insolvency for Aruba at 
the time of the Transaction, to categorize the company as “solidly profitable” 
would be far from the truth.  One of the biggest criticisms of Aruba’s business 
model in the time leading up to the Transaction was that, despite being able to 
grow revenues each quarter, Aruba was unable to convert revenue to earnings 
because of ongoing investments in R&D (research and development) and S&M 
(sales and marketing) needed to sustain that revenue growth.  This point is very 
clearly depicted in Exhibit 1 of the Dages Report (reproduced in Figure 1 below). 
 
                                                          
24.  Glob. GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc. (Golden Telecom I), 993 A.2d 497, 511 
(Del. Ch. 2010) (Strine, 105 V.C.), aff’d, 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010). 
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Aruba’s Revenue and Operating Income 2008 - 2014 
 
23. Mr. Marcus’s 3.5 percent growth rate (or 4.1 percent in a 2-stage 
DCF) is also at odds with the growth rates assumed by at least one equity analyst 
that relied on a 10-year DCF analysis to inform his price target for Aruba.  A 
February 26, 2015 report from Buckingham Research Group (“BRG”) indicates a 
price target of $20 per share that was informed, in part, by a DCF analysis that 
assumes a 12 percent discount rate and a 3 percent growth rate in perpetuity.  
Figure 2 presents the revenue forecast and revenue growth rates in the BRG DCF 
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Buckingham Research Group and Marcus Revenue Forecasts 
 
 
As Figure 2 illustrates, not only is BRG’s growth rate in the terminal period lower 
than Mr. Marcus’s but BRG’s revenue forecast across the 10 year period and the 
growth rates implied by that forecast are also significantly lower.  In fact, over the 
10 year forecast, Mr. Marcus projects in aggregate approximately $4 billion more 
in revenue for Aruba than the BRG analyst including approximately $750 million 
more in revenue in the final year of the forecast (2025).
25
 
24. Reducing Mr. Marcus’s perpetual growth rate to 2.75 percent, the rate 
                                                          
25.  “Potential Acquisition by HP Elevates Interest in WLAN,” Buckingham 
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assumed in the Dages report and a rate more aligned with a reasonable estimate of 
Aruba’s growth prospects at the time of the Transaction, further closes the gap 
between his fair value conclusion and my own.  Rebuttal Exhibit 8 presents an 
additional sensitivity of Mr. Marcus’s DCF assuming Aruba’s free cash flows will 
grow at 2.75 percent in perpetuity.  As the exhibit illustrates, applying a more 
reasonable perpetual growth rate further reduces his value conclusion from $30.41 
per share (in Rebuttal Exhibit 6) to $28.07 per share. 
V. MR. MARCUS’S 10 PERCENT DISCOUNT RATE IS BASED ON 
FLAWED AND/OR UNSUPPORTED ASSUMPTIONS AND 
CONTRADICTED BY OTHER ESTIMATES IN THE RECORD 
25. At the time of the Transaction, Aruba’s capital structure was 100 
percent equity and, as such, its weighted average cost of capital (“WACC”) was 
equal to its cost of equity.
26
  As in the Dages Report, Mr. Marcus estimates 
Aruba’s cost of equity using the CAPM model.
27
  The Dages and Marcus Reports 
agree that the appropriate risk-free rate to be used in the CAPM is 2.75 percent 
derived from the yield on the twenty year treasury rate and also agree that the 
equity risk premium (“ERP”) should reflect the supply-side measure from 
                                                          
26. Dages Report, p. 50. 
27.  Marcus Report, p. 80.  Dages Report, p. 51. 
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  There is a slight difference in the supply-side measures used (Dages 
6.21 percent and Marcus 6.19 percent) but that difference is immaterial to their 
respective WACC conclusions.
29
  The Dages and Marcus reports disagree with 
respect to the other two CAPM inputs – beta and size premium. 
26. Mr. Marcus’s beta estimate of 0.91 is derived from an arbitrary 
weighting of 2/3 Aruba’s observed beta and 1/3 the median beta of a group of 
companies that Mr. Marcus deems sufficiently comparable to Aruba.  Mr. Marcus 
measures the betas for Aruba and his peer companies based on two years of weekly 
returns.
30
  And while Mr. Marcus at least attempts to justify why the appropriate 
measurement window for Aruba is two years, he makes no such effort with respect 
to the weightings he assigns to Aruba’s observed beta and the peer median beta.
31
  
Furthermore, Mr. Marcus discloses in a footnote to the Marcus Report what his 
WACC and value conclusions would be if he assigned a 100 percent weighting to 
Aruba’s observed beta of 0.81 (WACC of 9.4 percent and value of $35.83 per 
share), but fails to mention what his WACC and value conclusions would be if he 
                                                          
28. Marcus Report, p. 80.  Dages Report, pp. 52 and 56-57. 
29. Marcus Report, p. 80.  Dages Report, pp. 56-57. 
30.  Marcus Report, p. 81. 
31. Marcus Report, pp. 82-83. 
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assigned a 100 percent weighting to the peer median beta of 1.11.
32
  If Mr. Marcus 
had based his WACC estimate solely on the observed median beta of his peer 
group, his WACC would have been 11.22 percent and his concluded fair value 
would have been $27.58 per share.
33
  In other words, his decision regarding the 
appropriate weighting to assign to his two beta measures can move his fair value 




27. Not only are Mr. Marcus’s beta weightings arbitrary and unsupported, 
his methodology for selecting the appropriate peer group is strangely at odds with 
other opinions offered in his report.  Mr. Marcus selects his peer group based on 
the consensus of the three financial advisors to Aruba and HP.  Yet, Mr. Marcus 
devotes more than ten pages in his Report to discussing how he believes these 
advisors operated under conflicts of interest that created incentives to get a deal 
done under any terms.
35
 
28. Additionally, Mr. Marcus fails to explain why he limits his peer group 
to firms he considers to be either WLAN Vendors or “pure play” networking 
                                                          
32. Marchs Report, p. 81.  
33. See Rebuttal Exhibit 9.  
34.  $35.83 - $27.58 = $8.25  
35.  Marcus Report, pp. 49-61. 
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companies or why he excludes the three firms that Qatalyst labels as “traditional 
networking” companies.  One of the firms Qatalyst put in the traditional 
networking category was Cisco – the largest WLAN vendor in the industry.  If Mr. 
Marcus were really interested in reflecting the financial advisors’ consensus on the 
appropriate peers to include in estimating an industry or peer-based beta, it would 
seem logical to look to the firms that the advisors actually included in their 
respective estimates of a peer median beta.  If one includes only those companies 
used by all three advisors in their respective WACC analyses, the peer group 
would consist of three companies: Juniper, F5 Networks, and Brocade (see Table 
2).  Importantly, this group excludes the top wireless vendors outside of Aruba and 
HP – Cisco, Ruckus, Aerohive, Ubiquiti, and Meru.  It is worth noting that three of 
these five companies (Ruckus, Aerohive and Meru) were identified by Mr. DePuy 
as the companies most similar to Aruba.
36
  This is precisely why I incorporate the 
opinions of six different analysts covering Aruba at the time of the Transaction in 






                                                          
36.  DePuy Report, ¶18. 
37. Dages Report, Exhibit 6. 
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Peers Included in Financial Advisors’ WACC Analyses and Their Unlevered Betas 
 
Qatalyst Evercore Barclays Consensus 
Company Beta Company Beta Company Beta Company Beta 
Juniper 1.69 Cisco 1.04 Aerohive 1.67 Brocade 1.06 
F5 1.93 Citrix 1.03 Arista 0.59 F5 1.62 
Brocade 0.86 Juniper 1.03 Brocade 1.18 Juniper 1.37 
Ubiquiti 2.30 F5 1.19 Broadsoft 1.28 Median 1.37 
Ruckus 0.19 Brocade 1.06 Cisco 0.98     
Median 1.69 Arista 0.62 F5 1.62     
    Riverbed 0.90 Juniper 1.37     
    NetScout 1.12 Polycom 1.32     
    InfoBox 0.88 Radware 1.06     
    NetGear 1.06 Ruckus 1.63     
    Radware 1.24 Ubiquiti 0.69     
    Gigamon 1.49 Median 1.28     
    Extreme 1.24         
    D-Link 0.43         
    A10 2.04         
    Median 1.06         
 
29. Putting the appropriate peers and weightings to the side, Mr. Marcus’s 
justification for relying on a two-year measurement window for Aruba’s observed 
beta is contradicted by the record evidence in this case and the beta estimates for 
Aruba and an appropriate group of peer companies derived using longer 
measurement windows.  Mr. Marcus justifies his two-year measurement window 
based on his “analysis of the Company’s history and the transformative changes 
that have occurred at the Company and in the industry over the past several 
years.”
38
  However, the record evidence indicates that the risk faced by Aruba’s 
                                                          
38. Marcus Report, p. 82. 
JX 669 - p. 23 of 77
 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 
22 
 
pure-play business model at the time of the Transaction was increasing, not 
decreasing.
39
  This is evidenced not only by Aruba’s stagnant market share in the 
WLAN industry prior to the Transaction, but also by the myriad of challenges 
Aruba faced at the time of the Transaction as discussed in the DePuy Report. 
30. Given the increasing risk of Aruba’s business model, the fact that 
Marcus’s two-year weekly beta measure for Aruba was lower (0.81) than the two-
year weekly beta measure for his peers (1.11) should have given Mr. Marcus 
pause.   Furthermore, if Mr. Marcus had considered other beta measures for Aruba 
(including those calculated using five year weekly and monthly estimation 
periods), he would have observed that Aruba’s two-year weekly beta measure is an 
outlier relative to all other measures of an Aruba or peer-based beta.
40
 
31. Finally, Mr. Marcus’s 10 percent WACC is at least 200 basis points 
lower than the midpoint estimates of the three financial advisors involved in the 
transaction (Barclays: 12 percent, Evercore: 12 percent, and Qatalyst: 12.25 
percent), as well as the two equity analysts that covered Aruba at the time of the 
Transaction and published their WACC estimates in a research report (Deutsche 
Bank: 12 percent and BRG: 12 percent).
41
 
                                                          
39. See DePuy Report, pp. 34-39. 
40.  See Dages Report, Exhibit 18. 
41. Aruba Networks, Inc., "Q4 Results", Deutsche Bank, February 27, 2015, p. 4. 
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32. Correcting for Mr. Marcus’s flawed beta assumption in his CAPM 
analysis increases his WACC from 10 percent to 12.6 percent and further 
decreases his value estimate from $28.07 to $21.16 per share (see Rebuttal 
Exhibit 10A).  However, Mr. Marcus includes a size premium in his WACC 
analysis, whereas in the Dages Report, I do not.  Given Aruba’s market cap of $2 





While it is common for valuation practitioners to apply a size premium to 
supplement the CAPM-derived cost of equity capital for those companies in the 
lowest three deciles (8-10), in my experience, a size premium is rarely applied to 
mid- or larger-cap companies.  Furthermore, Aruba did not share the characteristics 
that researchers have hypothesized for returns in excess of what is predicted by the 
CAPM.
43
  Removing the 1.60 percent size premium from Mr. Marcus’s WACC 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(ArubaAA0515272); Aruba Networks, Inc., "Potential Acquisition by HP 
Elevates Interest in WLAN", BRG, February 26, 2015, p. 6 
(ArubaAA0505356).  
42.  Duff & Phelps, 2015 Valuation Handbook, Guide to Cost of Capital, pp. 4-17 
– 4-25. 
43.  For example, researchers have hypothesized that the higher than predicted 
returns are caused by higher risk associated with lower liquidity or some other 
variable omitted from the CAPM that is correlated with size, such as lower 
share turnover (i.e., trading volume), higher transaction costs, or higher bid-
ask spreads.  2013 SBBI Valuation Yearbook, pp. 85, 101-103.  Aruba’s large 
market capitalization, extensive analyst coverage and trading on the 
NASDAQ exchange meant that it did not share these characteristics of firms 
requiring a size premium. 
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decreases his WACC estimate from 12.6 percent (after correcting his flawed beta 
assumption) to 11 percent and his value per share estimate increases from $21.16 
to $24.86 (see Rebuttal Exhibit 10B). 
VI. MR. MARCUS’S SBC FORECAST IS UNREASONABLE. 
33. In the Dages Report, I consider both the SBC forecast reflected in the 
Proxy and relied on by Mr. Marcus (the “Proxy SBC Forecast”) and the forecast 
reflected in the Barclays model (the “Barclays SBC Forecast”).  Furthermore, I 
matched each of these SBC forecasts with a revenue forecast that is a better 
approximation of the revenue growth one would expect with that level of SBC 
expense.  More specifically, I matched a revenue forecast that reflected the 
expected industry growth rates with the lower Proxy SBC Forecast as that forecast 
was closer to the industry level of SBC expense as a percentage of revenue.
44
  
Under the same reasoning, I matched the revenue forecast in the February 
Projections, a forecast that contemplated growth well above the industry, with the 
higher Barclays SBC Forecast, as that forecast reflected a level of SBC expense 
that was higher than the industry average.
45
  Mr. Marcus, on the other hand, 
matches the lower Proxy SBC Forecast with the higher revenue forecast in the 
                                                          
44. Dages Report, Exhibit 19B. 
45. Dages Report, Exhibit 19A. 
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February Projections, effectively assuming that Aruba will experience above 
average revenue growth but pay below average SBC rates to achieve it.  This is an 
unreasonable assumption, particularly in light of the fact that Aruba’s SBC 
expense had historically been well in excess of the industry average.
46
 
34. The disconnect between Mr. Marcus’s revenue forecast and his SBC 
forecasts is further underscored by the timeline of their creation.  The Proxy SBC 
Forecast was created in March 2015, after the Transaction was announced, for 
purposes of reconciling the GAAP and non-GAAP figures that were included in 
the Proxy.  In other words, the Proxy SBC Forecast did not exist in February 2015 
when the February Projections were created.
47
  In contrast, the Barclay’s SBC 




35. Correcting for Mr. Marcus’s unreasonable assumption regarding 
Aruba’s future SBC expense further reduces his value conclusion from $24.86 per 
share to $21.32 per share (see Rebuttal Exhibit 11). 
 
                                                          
46. Dages Report, p. 9. 
47. Dages Report, p. 46. 
48. Barclays, Project Aspen Board Materials, February 27, 2015 
(ArubaAA0519962-90) at 75.  Note different SBC expense amounts due to 
change from Aruba’s fiscal year to HP’s fiscal year.  See also, BARC-
ARU_00033967 at tab: "ARUN P&L." 
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VII. MR. MARCUS’S TAX RATE ASSUMPTION IS INCORRECT AND 
SERVES TO OVERSTATE HIS FAIR VALUE CONCLUSION. 
36. In his report, Mr. Marcus calculates taxes on operating income in his 
DCF analysis using tax rates of 4 percent in both 2015 and 2016 and 25 percent 
thereafter based on the rates in the Qatalyst Partners March 1, 2015 Presentation.
49
  
In the Dages Report, I calculate the taxes on operating income in my DCF analysis 
using the 30 percent (effective) tax rate that was reflected in the February 
Projections in the Proxy and utilized by Barclay’s in its fairness analysis.
50
  The 
lower tax rates assumed by Qatalyst and Mr. Marcus, particularly in 2015 and 
2016, presumably reflect a tax benefit that is not detailed or analyzed or supported 
in the Marcus Report.  The Qatalyst presentation indicates that the 4 percent rate 
reflects “NOLs” and “foreign tax structure benefits,” but provides no analytical 
support.  Furthermore, the Qatalyst presentation reflects the 30 percent effective 
rate in its summary of both the “Athens Management Case” and “Athens Street 
Case” and utilizes a 31 percent tax rate for Aruba in its WACC Analysis.
51
  
                                                          
49. Marcus Report, Exhibit 7-1.  Calculated as cash taxes / operating income. 
50. Dages Report, Exhibit 19A; Aruba Networks, Inc. Schedule 14A, April 3, 
2015 (“Aruba Proxy”), p. 56 (tax rate calculated as 1 – (Non-GAAP Net 
Income / Non-GAAP Operating Income)); Barclays, Project Aspen Board 
Materials, February 27, 2015 (ArubaAA0519962-90) at 81. 
51. Qatalyst Partners, Project Athens, Materials for Discussion, March 2015 
(ARUN000093-130) at 121-123 (tax rate calculated as 1 – (Net Income / 
Operating Income)). 
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37. Correcting for Mr. Marcus’s tax rate assumption further reduces his 
value conclusion from $21.32 to $19.85 (See Rebuttal Exhibit 12) 
VIII. THE REVENUE GROWTH AND MARGIN EXPANSION IN THE 
FEBRUARY PROJECTIONS ARE AT ODDS WITH THE 
CHALLENGES FACING ARUBA AND THE WLAN INDUSTRY.  
38. In the Dages Report, I consider two different revenue forecasts: (1) 
the actual revenue forecast in the February Projections and (2) a revenue forecast 
where revenues grow each year at the industry growth rate.  I also applied separate 
SBC expense forecasts to the two revenue forecasts to reflect the fact that higher 
growth would likely come at the cost of higher SBC expense.  Figure 3 presents 
Aruba’s revenue growth rates as reflected in the February Projections (Dages, Ex. 
19A) and the industry growth sensitivity (Dages, Ex. 19B). 
Figure 3 
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39. Given the significant challenges Aruba faced at the time of the 
Transaction, the likelihood that the Company could both grow market share and 
significantly increase operating margins was very low.  According to Mr. DePuy, 
Aruba’ would mean that Aruba would likely have to lower its prices in order to 
defend its market share and that would put downward pressure on its operating 
margins.
52
  Figure 4 presents Aruba’s EBITDA margins historically (for fiscal 
years 2013 and 2014) and as reflected in the two versions of February Projections 
presented in the Dages Report. 
Figure 4 
Aruba’s EBITDA Margins 
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40. In order to illustrate the value implications of Aruba failing to achieve 
the significant margin expansion reflected in the February Projections, I present 
sensitivities of both my $19.85 per share fair value estimate (see Dages Report, 
Exhibit 19A) and my  $19.45 per share value under the industry growth scenario 
(see Dages Report, Exhibit 19B).  Rebuttal Exhibits 13A and 13B are 
replications of Exhibits 19A and 19B from the Dages Report.  Rebuttal Exhibits 
13C and 13D present sensitivities assuming operating margins are 100 basis points 
lower across the forecast period for each scenario while Rebuttal Exhibits 13E 
and 13F present sensitivities assuming operating margins are 200 basis points 
lower across the forecast period for each scenario.  The resulting values from 
Rebuttal Exhibits 13A-F are summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3 




 Sensitivity Exhibit Value 
   Dages Report, Ex. 19A 13A $19.85 
Dages Report, Ex. 19B 13B $19.45 
Dages Report, Ex. 19A -100bp Margins 13C $18.77 
Dages Report, Ex. 19B -100bp Margins 13D $18.51 
Dages Report, Ex. 19A -200bp Margins 13E $17.70 
Dages Report, Ex. 19B -200bp Margins 13F $17.57 
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IX. MR. MARCUS’S COMPARABLE COMPANY ANALYSIS, WHEN 
CORRECTED, FAILS TO SUPPORT HIS FAIR VALUE 
CONCLUSION. 
41. Although Mr. Marcus includes a comparable company analysis in his 
opening report and cites to his analysis early in his report, he ultimately does not 
ascribe any meaning to its results due to his belief that no one company or group of 
companies was sufficiently comparable to Aruba.
53
  The Marcus Report does not 
indicate what criteria (if any) were used in determining whether a company was 
sufficiently comparable to Aruba as to render its relative value indication 
meaningful.  Furthermore, Mr. Marcus does not explain why the companies that 
were sufficiently comparable for purposes of estimating an industry or peer-based 
beta were not sufficiently comparable for valuation purposes.  In addition to Mr. 
Marcus’s unsupported and internally inconsistent opinions regarding the 
comparability of the peer group, his comparable company analysis suffers from 
additional flaws that render the ultimate fair value indication meaningless. 
42. First, Mr. Marcus includes pure-play networking companies in his 
comparable company analysis that serve to significantly overstate the resulting 
value indication, all without indicating to the Court the impact of his inclusion.  
Mr. Marcus does not provide any explanation for why he believes pure-play 
networking companies should be included at all, let alone why he believes they are 
                                                          
53.  Marcus Report, pp. 4, 86 and 87. 
JX 669 - p. 32 of 77
 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 
31 
 
as comparable to Aruba as pure-play WLAN companies.  Given that Aruba itself is 
a pure-play WLAN company, one would expect other pure-play WLAN companies 
to provide the most meaningful valuation benchmark.  Furthermore, Mr. DePuy, 
Respondent’s industry expert, indicates that the three companies that are the most 
similar to Aruba are Ruckus, Aerohive, and Meru.  All three of these companies 
are included in the pure-play WLAN category.  Mr. Marcus also fails to explain 
why he included pure-play networking companies but excluded traditional 
networking companies (like Cisco) from his analysis.  Without establishing a 
benchmark of any kind for what constitutes sufficient comparability, it is 
completely arbitrary for Mr. Marcus to include one group but exclude the other. 
43. Removing the pure-play networking peers from Mr. Marcus’s 
comparable company analysis reduces the values indicated by that analysis 
considerably.  Furthermore, including the traditional networking peers, the group 
that Mr. Marcus arbitrarily excludes would also reduce the values indicated by his 
comparable company analysis.  Rebuttal Exhibit 14 presents the multiples for 
each company in Mr. Marcus’s comparable company analysis and also reports the 
mean and median for the pure-play WLAN companies, the pure-play networking 
companies, and all companies combined. The exhibit also provides the percentile 
relationships between the two groups.  Rebuttal Exhibit 15A presents a 
replication of Mr. Marcus’s comparable company analysis and Rebuttal Exhibit 
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15B reruns the same analysis removing the pure-play networking peers.  As the 
exhibits demonstrate, removing the pure-play networking peers from Mr. Marcus’s 
comparable company analysis reduces the value indication from a range of $12.97 
to $36.89 per share to a range of $7.51 to $22.53 per share. 
44. Second, Mr. Marcus includes an arbitrary “control premium” in his 
comparable company analysis that serves to further overstate the resulting value.  
Again, Mr. Marcus provides no support for why he believes a control premium is 
warranted, nor does he explain why 20 percent is the appropriate level of the 
control premium.  There has been considerable debate amongst academics and 
valuation practitioners on both the size of a control premium as well as whether or 
not one needs to include such a premium in a comparable company analysis.  For 
example, Nath (1990, 1994) and Cornell (1992) find that in the majority of 
situations there is no value associated with a change of control because current 
board and management are effectively maximizing the value of the company. In 
these situations, according to Nath and Cornell, the control premium is zero.
54
 
45. Removing the control premium from Mr. Marcus’s comparable 
company analysis further reduces the values indicated by his analysis considerably.  
                                                          
54.  Nath, Eric, 1990, Control premiums and minority interest discounts in private 
companies, Business Valuation Review; Nath, Eric, 1994, A tale of two 
markets, Business Valuation Review; Cornell, Bradford, 1992, Corporate 
Valuation, Business One Irwin, New York. 
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Rebuttal Exhibit 16A presents a replication of Rebuttal Exhibit 15A excluding 
the control premium and Rebuttal Exhibit 16B presents a replication of Rebuttal 
Exhibit 15B excluding the control premium.  As Rebuttal Exhibits 16A and 16B 
indicate, removing the arbitrary control premium from Mr. Marcus’s comparable 
company analysis further reduces the value indication from a range of $7.51 to 
$22.53 per share in Rebuttal Exhibit 15B to a range of $6.26 to $18.77 per share 
in Rebuttal Exhibit 16B.  Table 4 below presents a summary of the value 
conclusions from Rebuttal Exhibits 15 and 16. 
Table 4 
Sensitivities of Marcus Comparable Company Analysis 
 
 
Rebuttal Value Range 
Sensitivity Exhibit Low   High 
     Marcus Original 15A $12.97 
 
$36.89 
Marcus Only WLAN Vendors 15B $7.51 
 
$22.53 
Marcus No Minority Discount 16A $10.81 
 
$30.74 




X. MR. MARCUS’S OBSERVATIONS REGARDING COMPARABLE 
TRANSACTIONS AND WHAT HE TERMS “EXTERNAL CHECKS 
ON VALUATION” ARE FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED AND 
MISLEADING. 
46. The Marcus Report does not include a comparable transactions 
analysis but does make reference to what Mr. Marcus calls “external checks on 
valuation.”  Mr. Marcus does not include a comparable transaction analysis 
because he concludes that no one transaction or group of transactions with the 
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requisite information available was sufficiently comparable to Aruba as to provide 
a meaningful value comparison.
55
  He therefore points to what he believes are 
“additional indications of Aruba’s value,” including the terms of Qatalyst’s fees, 
details of Aruba’s stock repurchase program, and an alleged DCF analysis 
performed by Aruba’s CFO after the fact.
56
  Mr. Marcus’s conclusions regarding 
comparable transactions and so-called external price indications are flawed and 
misleading. 
47. As a primary matter, Mr. Marcus’s review of potential comparable 
transactions suffers from the same contradiction as his other analyses in that he 
uses the consensus opinion of the allegedly conflicted financial advisors to 
determine the list of potentially comparable transactions.
57
  Furthermore, Mr. 
Marcus’s opinion that there are no suitable transactions with sufficient data to 
determine the level of synergies ignores acquisitions by financial buyers where 
there typically are no synergies.
58
 
48. Again, Mr. Marcus fails to provide any kind of benchmark or criteria 
for what constitutes sufficient comparability, so it is difficult to refute this 
                                                          
55.  Marcus Report, p. 88. 
56. Marcus Report, pp. 88-90. 
57. Marcus Report, p. 87.  
58. Marcus Report, p. 88.  
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purported analysis without making multiple assumptions.  At a minimum, I would 
expect him to provide the list of the 70 deals he considered as potential candidates, 
the 30 deals he determined to have “some information available,” and at least a 
rough definition of what qualifies as “some information.”
59
 
49. Mr. DePuy identifies several recent acquisitions of WLAN companies 
that he believes to be similar to Aruba including: (1) Brocade’s acquisition of 
Ruckus Wireless; and (2) Fortinet’s acquisition of Meru Networks.
60
  Given that 
both Ruckus and Meru, like Aruba, had little or no operating income, revenue 
multiples serve as the next best valuation benchmark.  Rebuttal Exhibit 17 
presents the multiples of total transaction value to LTM revenue for Ruckus and 
Meru acquisitions as well as HP’s acquisition of Aruba.  Based on those multiples, 
Aruba was acquired at the same revenue multiple as Ruckus and at a significantly 
higher multiple than Meru. 
50. Having dismissed the relevance of both the comparable company and 
comparable transaction analyses, Mr. Marcus suggests some “external checks on 
valuation” with at least the implication that he believes them to be more relevant 
than the relative valuation methods he affords no weight.61  One such check, 
                                                          
59. Marcus Report, p. 88.  
60.  DePuy Report, ¶22. 
61.  Marcus Report, pp. 88-90. 
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according to Mr. Marcus, is the existence of what Mr. Marcus refers to as “internal 
PT [price target] for the repurchase of shares.”62  However, Mr. Marcus’s 
representation of this so-called target is misleading.  As Mr. Marcus states in his 
report, the Aruba Board imposed limits on the repurchase of shares including a 
max repurchase price of $25 per share.63  To therefore call $25 per share a “target 
price” implies an intention to repurchase shares at the $25 per share “target price,” 
when obviously the goal would be to purchase shares at prices below the $25 per 
share price limit.  Mr. Marcus doubles down on this mischaracterization when he 
states that the $25 price is therefore the floor for the Board’s view on “intrinsic 
value” because a company would never repurchase shares above what it thought to 
be fair value.64  Mr. Marcus fails to address academic research indicating that 
companies actually increase share buybacks when stocks are overvalued.  For 
example, Pedersen (2014) found that the companies in the S&P 500 index have 
had a tendency to increase share buybacks when the share price was high relative 
to the estimated value, and decrease share buybacks when the share price was low 
relative to the estimated value.
65
 
                                                          
62.  Marcus Report, p. 88. 
63.  Marcus Report, pp. 89-90. 
64.  Marcus Report, p. 90. 
65.  Pedersen, Magnus Erik Hvass, 2014, The Value of Share Buybacks, p. 89. 
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51. Mr. Marcus’s other “external checks on valuation” are equally 
misrepresented and flawed.  Mr. Marcus claims that the break points (the prices at 
the percentage fee increases) discussed in Qatalyst’s fee negotiations with Aruba 
are somehow indicative of its opinion on Aruba’s fair value.  What Aruba 
management “wanted” to sell the company for or where an investment banker 
believed to be the range of expected outcomes and reasonable breakpoints to 
reward those outcomes do not necessarily indicate either party’s opinion on 
standalone fair value.  Furthermore, and as Mr. Marcus acknowledges, these fee 
breakpoints were not ultimately agreed to and included in the final engagement 
letter. 
52. Mr. Marcus’s final external check on valuation is a DCF valuation 
that Mr. Marcus claims to be based on “management’s model without synergies.”
66
  
However, the analysis that Mr. Marcus cites contains a calculation error which 
serves to overstate the resulting value.  Rebuttal Exhibit 18 presents a replication 
of the DCF valuation that is attached to the e-mail that Mr. Marcus cites and 
utilizes the actual numbers shown on the page.  The exhibit indicates that based on 
the cash flows presented in the valuation model,  the 11.99 percent discount rate 
and 3 percent perpetuity growth rate that are also presented in the model, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
66.  Marcus Report, p. 90. 
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resulting present value of discounted cash flows is $3.3 billion rather than $4.5 
billion, as Mr. Markus claims.  Furthermore, at the 16 to 18 percent discount rate 
range that the email indicates HP’s CFO believed to be a more appropriate range, 
the resulting value drops to between $1.9 billion and $2.2 billion. 
53. In summary Mr. Marcus’s “external checks on valuation” as well as 
his dismissal of any comparable transaction fail to provide any reasonable basis for 
the Court to assess Aruba’s standalone fair value.  When combined with the errors 
and unreasonable assumptions embedded within his DCF analysis as detailed 
above and the selective presentation and calculation within his comparable 
company analysis (that he also dismisses), there remains no viable basis for his 
$32.57 Aruba standalone fair value opinion. 
XI. CONCLUSION 
54. Based upon the analyses and record evidence presented in my opening 
report and this rebuttal report, as well as my review of the rebuttal report of Chris 
DePuy, I believe the standalone fair value of Aruba as of May 18, 2015 is no 
greater than $19.85 per share. 
55. I specifically add the term “no greater than” to reflect the potential 
valuation impact of the additional insights from Chris DePuy’s industry 
chronology and his contemporaneous summary of challenges facing Aruba and 
other single product vendors in the WLAN market.  While the Aruba February 
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synergistic performance of a unified HP/Aruba entity, the changing WLAN
competitive environment (beginning in 2013 and running through the valuation
date) certainly raises questions about Aruba’s ability to meet the February
Projections levels as a single product standalone vendor. The sensitivities included
in this rebuttal report are intended to provide the Court with a reliable and
consistent basis to analyze the value impact of these challenges to the Aruba
forecast and all iterations of such sensitivities result in values below $19.85 per
share.
Kevin F. Dages
September 2, 2016 FR
—My Commission Expires May 7, 2019
39
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REBUTTAL EXHIBIT 1
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Aruba Networks, Inc. 
Aruba Quarterly Market Share 
2008-2014 
Source: IDC WW WLAN Tracker_FinalHistoricalPivot_2014Q4_Aruba.xlsx, March 3, 2015, (produced on Aug. 19, 2016, no bates label). 
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2008A 2009A 2010A 2011A 2012A 2013A 2014A
Aruba Networks, Inc. 
Aruba Annual Market Share 
2008-2014 
Source: IDC WW WLAN Tracker_FinalHistoricalPivot_2014Q4_Aruba.xlsx, March 3, 2015, (produced on Aug. 19, 2016, no bates label). 
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# Source 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2014-2019
[1] Dell'Oro Group (January 2015) $4,354.9 $4,841.5 $5,604.7 $6,156.1 $6,784.5 $7,261.6 10.8%
[2] Infonetics (March 2015) $4,761.9 $5,453.1 $6,278.4 $7,005.7 $7,555.6 $8,078.2 11.1%
[3] IDC (September 2014) $5,041.3 $5,646.0 $6,265.9 $6,895.1 $7,471.7
Average $4,719.4 $5,313.5 $6,049.6 $6,685.6 $7,270.6 $7,669.9 10.2%
Sources:
[1]: Wireless LAN Report, Five Year Forecast 2015 – 2019, Dell’Oro Group, January 2015, Table 1 (ArubaAA0196131-59 at 44).
[2]: Wireless LAN Equipment and WiFi Phones, Infonetics Research, March 10, 2015, (ArubaAA0535775).
[3]: IDC WW WLAN Tracker_ForecastPivot_2014Q2_Aruba.xlsx, September 16, 2014.
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2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Aruba Networks, Inc. 
Projected Revenue Growth Rates for Aruba and WLAN Market 
2015-2019 
February Projections Dell'Oro (January 2015) Infonetics (March 2015) IDC (Sept 2014)
Sources: Rebuttal Exhibit 3. Dages Report Exhibit 15. 
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REBUTTAL EXHIBIT 5A
Aruba Networks, Inc.
Aruba Annual Market Share
2018-2019
# 2008A 2009A 2010A 2011A 2012A 2013A 2014A 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E
[1] Aruba Networks, Inc. $130.5 $148.1 $212.6 $347.7 $424.5 $446.3 $565.0 $675.9 $804.5 $957.2 $1,101.4 $1,238.6
[2] Projected Growth Rate % 19.6% 19.0% 19.0% 15.1% 12.5%
[3] WLAN Market $1,873.1 $1,836.9 $2,349.9 $3,027.1 $3,841.6 $4,439.9 $4,816.1 $5,421.0 $6,177.8 $6,825.7 $7,426.8 $7,944.8
[4] Projected Growth Rate % 12.6% 14.0% 10.5% 8.8% 7.0%
[5] Aruba Market Share 7.0% 8.1% 9.0% 11.5% 11.1% 10.1% 11.7% 12.5% 13.0% 14.0% 14.8% 15.6%
Notes and Sources: USD in millions.
[1]: IDC WW WLAN Tracker_FinalHistoricalPivot_2014Q4_Aruba.xlsx, March 3, 2015, (produced on Aug. 19, 2016, no bates label).
[2]: Rebuttal Exhibit 4.
[3]: IDC WW WLAN Tracker_FinalHistoricalPivot_2014Q4_Aruba.xlsx, March 3, 2015, (produced on Aug. 19, 2016, no bates label).
[4]: Rebuttal Exhibit 4. Average of Projected Industry Revenue Growth Rates. 
[5] = [1] / [3].
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2008A 2009A 2010A 2011A 2012A 2013A 2014A 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E
Aruba Networks, Inc. 
Aruba Annual Market Share 
2008-2019 
Source: Rebuttal Exhibit 5A. 
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REBUTTAL EXHIBIT 6
Aruba Networks, Inc.
Marcus Discounted Cash Flow Analysis Removing Third Stage
2015-2020
Terminal
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Value
Revenue $872.0 $1,038.0 $1,235.4 $1,420.7 $1,598.3 $1,758.0
Total Cost of Revenue $253.0 $286.0 $332.0 $378.0 $424.0 $466.0
Total Operating Expenses $524.0 $596.0 $684.0 $785.0 $883.0 $977.0
EBIT $25.0 $156.0 $219.4 $257.7 $291.3 $315.0
Cash Taxes ($1.0) ($6.2) ($54.9) ($64.4) ($72.8) ($78.8)
Unlevered Net Income $24.0 $149.8 $164.6 $193.3 $218.5 $236.3
D&A $16.7 $24.0 $63.0 $30.0 $34.0 $35.0
Changes in WC ($1.7) $9.0 $37.0 $19.0 $18.0 $16.0
Capital Expenditures ($20.9) ($24.0) ($68.0) ($30.0) ($33.0) ($35.0)
Unlevered FCF $18.1 $158.8 $196.6 $212.3 $237.5 $252.3 $4,027.2
Discount Period 0.10 0.70 1.70 2.70 3.70 4.70
Discount Factor at 10.0% 0.99 0.94 0.85 0.77 0.70 0.64
Present Value of Cash Flows $3.6 $148.5 $167.2 $164.1 $167.0 $161.2 $2,574.3
Present Value of Cash Flows and Terminal Value $3,385.9
Debt
Cash $291.0
Equity Value $3,676.9 PGR 3.50%
Shares Outstanding 120.9
Equity Value per Share $30.41 Delta ($2.16)
Source: Marcus Report Exhibit 7.1.
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REBUTTAL EXHIBIT 7
Aruba Networks, Inc.
Two Stage Marcus Discounted Cash Flow Analysis Using 4.07% PGR to Reach Marcus Valuation Conclusion
2015-2020
Terminal
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Value
Revenue $872.0 $1,038.0 $1,235.4 $1,420.7 $1,598.3 $1,758.0
Total Cost of Revenue $253.0 $286.0 $332.0 $378.0 $424.0 $466.0
Total Operating Expenses $524.0 $596.0 $684.0 $785.0 $883.0 $977.0
EBIT $25.0 $156.0 $219.4 $257.7 $291.3 $315.0
Cash Taxes ($1.0) ($6.2) ($54.9) ($64.4) ($72.8) ($78.8)
Unlevered Net Income $24.0 $149.8 $164.6 $193.3 $218.5 $236.3
D&A $16.7 $24.0 $63.0 $30.0 $34.0 $35.0
Changes in WC ($1.7) $9.0 $37.0 $19.0 $18.0 $16.0
Capital Expenditures ($20.9) ($24.0) ($68.0) ($30.0) ($33.0) ($35.0)
Unlevered FCF $18.1 $158.8 $196.6 $212.3 $237.5 $252.3 $4,435.8
Discount Period 0.10 0.70 1.70 2.70 3.70 4.70
Discount Factor at 10.0% 0.99 0.94 0.85 0.77 0.70 0.64
Present Value of Cash Flows $3.6 $148.5 $167.2 $164.1 $167.0 $161.2 $2,835.5
Present Value of Cash Flows and Terminal Value $3,647.1
Debt
Cash $291.0
Equity Value $3,938.1 PGR 4.07%
Shares Outstanding 120.9
Equity Value per Share $32.57
Source: Marcus Report Exhibit 7.1.
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REBUTTAL EXHIBIT 8
Aruba Networks, Inc.
Two Stage Marcus Discounted Cash Flow Analysis Using Dages PGR
2015-2020
Terminal
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Value
Revenue $872.0 $1,038.0 $1,235.4 $1,420.7 $1,598.3 $1,758.0
Total Cost of Revenue $253.0 $286.0 $332.0 $378.0 $424.0 $466.0
Total Operating Expenses $524.0 $596.0 $684.0 $785.0 $883.0 $977.0
EBIT $25.0 $156.0 $219.4 $257.7 $291.3 $315.0
Cash Taxes ($1.0) ($6.2) ($54.9) ($64.4) ($72.8) ($78.8)
Unlevered Net Income $24.0 $149.8 $164.6 $193.3 $218.5 $236.3
D&A $16.7 $24.0 $63.0 $30.0 $34.0 $35.0
Changes in WC ($1.7) $9.0 $37.0 $19.0 $18.0 $16.0
Capital Expenditures ($20.9) ($24.0) ($68.0) ($30.0) ($33.0) ($35.0)
Unlevered FCF $18.1 $158.8 $196.6 $212.3 $237.5 $252.3 $3,583.4
Discount Period 0.10 0.70 1.70 2.70 3.70 4.70
Discount Factor at 10.0% 0.99 0.94 0.85 0.77 0.70 0.64
Present Value of Cash Flows $3.6 $148.5 $167.2 $164.1 $167.0 $161.2 $2,290.7
Present Value of Cash Flows and Terminal Value $3,102.3
Debt
Cash $291.0
Equity Value $3,393.3 PGR 2.75%
Shares Outstanding 120.9
Equity Value per Share $28.07 Delta ($2.35)
Source: Marcus Report Exhibit 7.1.
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REBUTTAL EXHIBIT 9
Aruba Networks, Inc.
Marcus Discounted Cash Flow Analysis Using 11.22% WACC
2015-2025
Terminal
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 Value
Revenue $872.0 $1,038.0 $1,235.4 $1,420.7 $1,598.3 $1,758.0 $1,916.0 $2,070.0 $2,214.0 $2,347.0 $2,465.0
Total Cost of Revenue $253.0 $286.0 $332.0 $378.0 $424.0 $466.0
Total Operating Expenses $524.0 $596.0 $684.0 $785.0 $883.0 $977.0
EBIT $25.0 $156.0 $219.4 $257.7 $291.3 $315.0 $343.31 $370.90 $396.71 $420.54 $441.68
Cash Taxes ($1.0) ($6.2) ($54.9) ($64.4) ($72.8) ($78.8) ($85.8) ($92.7) ($99.2) ($105.1) ($110.4)
Unlevered Net Income $24.0 $149.8 $164.6 $193.3 $218.5 $236.3 $257.5 $278.2 $297.5 $315.4 $331.3
D&A $3.0 $24.0 $63.0 $30.0 $34.0 $35.0 $38.0 $41.0 $44.0 $47.0 $49.0
Changes in WC $1.0 $9.0 $37.0 $19.0 $18.0 $16.0
Capital Expenditures ($2.0) ($24.0) ($68.0) ($30.0) ($33.0) ($35.0) ($38.0) ($41.0) ($44.0) ($47.0) ($49.0)
Unlevered FCF $26.0 $158.8 $196.6 $212.3 $237.5 $252.3 $257.5 $278.2 $297.5 $315.4 $331.3 $4,441.1
Discount Period 0.10 0.70 1.70 2.70 3.70 4.70 5.70 6.70 7.70 8.70 9.70
Discount Factor at 11.22% 0.99 0.93 0.83 0.75 0.67 0.61 0.55 0.49 0.44 0.40 0.36
Present Value of Cash Flows $25.7 $147.3 $164.0 $159.2 $160.2 $153.0 $140.4 $136.4 $131.2 $125.0 $118.1 $1,582.7





Equity Value per Share $27.58
Source: Marcus Report Exhibit 7.1.
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REBUTTAL EXHIBIT 10A
Aruba Networks, Inc.
Two Stage Marcus Discounted Cash Flow Analysis Using Dages PGR and Implied Dages Beta
2015-2020
Terminal
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Value
Revenue $872.0 $1,038.0 $1,235.4 $1,420.7 $1,598.3 $1,758.0
Total Cost of Revenue $253.0 $286.0 $332.0 $378.0 $424.0 $466.0
Total Operating Expenses $524.0 $596.0 $684.0 $785.0 $883.0 $977.0
EBIT $25.0 $156.0 $219.4 $257.7 $291.3 $315.0
Cash Taxes ($1.0) ($6.2) ($54.9) ($64.4) ($72.8) ($78.8)
Unlevered Net Income $24.0 $149.8 $164.6 $193.3 $218.5 $236.3
D&A $16.7 $24.0 $63.0 $30.0 $34.0 $35.0
Changes in WC ($1.7) $9.0 $37.0 $19.0 $18.0 $16.0
Capital Expenditures ($20.9) ($24.0) ($68.0) ($30.0) ($33.0) ($35.0)
Unlevered FCF $18.1 $158.8 $196.6 $212.3 $237.5 $252.3 $2,631.3
Discount Period 0.10 0.70 1.70 2.70 3.70 4.70
Discount Factor at 12.6% 0.99 0.92 0.82 0.73 0.64 0.57
Present Value of Cash Flows $3.6 $146.1 $160.6 $154.0 $153.0 $144.4 $1,505.9
Present Value of Cash Flows and Terminal Value $2,267.6
Debt
Cash $291.0
Equity Value $2,558.6 PGR 2.75%
Shares Outstanding 120.9
Equity Value per Share $21.16 Delta ($6.90)
Source: Marcus Report Exhibit 7.1.
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REBUTTAL EXHIBIT 10B
Aruba Networks, Inc.
Two Stage Marcus Discounted Cash Flow Analysis Using Dages PGR, Implied Dages Beta, Dages Risk Premium, 
and Removing Marcus Size Premium
2015-2020
Terminal
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Value
Revenue $872.0 $1,038.0 $1,235.4 $1,420.7 $1,598.3 $1,758.0
Total Cost of Revenue $253.0 $286.0 $332.0 $378.0 $424.0 $466.0
Total Operating Expenses $524.0 $596.0 $684.0 $785.0 $883.0 $977.0
EBIT $25.0 $156.0 $219.4 $257.7 $291.3 $315.0
Cash Taxes ($1.0) ($6.2) ($54.9) ($64.4) ($72.8) ($78.8)
Unlevered Net Income $24.0 $149.8 $164.6 $193.3 $218.5 $236.3
D&A $16.7 $24.0 $63.0 $30.0 $34.0 $35.0
Changes in WC ($1.7) $9.0 $37.0 $19.0 $18.0 $16.0
Capital Expenditures ($20.9) ($24.0) ($68.0) ($30.0) ($33.0) ($35.0)
Unlevered FCF $18.1 $158.8 $196.6 $212.3 $237.5 $252.3 $3,141.7
Discount Period 0.10 0.70 1.70 2.70 3.70 4.70
Discount Factor at 11.0% 0.99 0.93 0.84 0.75 0.68 0.61
Present Value of Cash Flows $3.6 $147.5 $164.6 $160.1 $161.4 $154.4 $1,923.2
Present Value of Cash Flows and Terminal Value $2,714.8
Debt
Cash $291.0
Equity Value $3,005.8 PGR 2.75%
Shares Outstanding 120.9
Equity Value per Share $24.86 Delta $3.70
Source: Marcus Report Exhibit 7.1.
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REBUTTAL EXHIBIT 11
Aruba Networks, Inc.
Two Stage Marcus Discounted Cash Flow Analysis Using Dages PGR, Implied Dages Beta, Dages Risk Premium, 
Removing Marcus Size Premium, Using Dages SBC and Dages Stub Period
2015-2020
Terminal
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Value
Revenue $872.0 $1,038.0 $1,235.4 $1,420.7 $1,598.3 $1,758.0
Total Cost of Revenue
Total Operating Expenses $775.1 $899.7 $1,054.7 $1,211.5 $1,362.9 $1,499.1
EBIT $96.9 $138.3 $180.7 $209.2 $235.4 $258.9
Cash Taxes ($3.9) ($5.5) ($45.2) ($52.3) ($58.9) ($64.7)
Unlevered Net Income $93.0 $132.8 $135.5 $156.9 $176.6 $194.2
D&A $16.7 $24.0 $63.0 $30.0 $34.0 $35.0
Changes in WC ($1.7) $9.0 $37.0 $19.0 $18.0 $16.0
Capital Expenditures ($20.9) ($24.0) ($68.0) ($30.0) ($33.0) ($35.0)
Unlevered FCF $87.1 $141.8 $167.5 $175.9 $195.6 $210.2 $2,617.6
Discount Period 0.10 0.70 1.70 2.70 3.70 4.70
Discount Factor at 11.0% 0.99 0.93 0.84 0.75 0.68 0.61
Present Value of Cash Flows $17.5 $131.7 $140.3 $132.7 $132.9 $128.7 $1,602.4
Present Value of Cash Flows and Terminal Value $2,286.1
Debt
Cash $291.0
Equity Value $2,577.1 PGR 2.75%
Shares Outstanding 120.90
Equity Value per Share $21.32 Delta ($3.55)
Source: Marcus Report Exhibit 7.1.
Note: The use of Dages stub period methodology lowers Marcus valuation conclusion by $0.10. The use of Dages SBC lowers Marcus valuation 
conclusion by $3.45.
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REBUTTAL EXHIBIT 12
Aruba Networks, Inc.
Two Stage Marcus Discounted Cash Flow Analysis Using Dages PGR, Implied Dages Beta, Dages Risk Premium, 
Removing Marcus Size Premium, Using Dages SBC, Dages Stub Period, Dages Shares Outstanding, Dages Net 
Investment and Dages Tax Rate
2015-2020
Terminal
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Value
Revenue $872.0 $1,038.0 $1,235.4 $1,420.7 $1,598.3 $1,758.0
Total Cost of Revenue
Total Operating Expenses $775.1 $899.7 $1,054.7 $1,211.5 $1,362.9 $1,499.1
EBIT $96.9 $138.3 $180.7 $209.2 $235.4 $258.9
Cash Taxes ($29.1) ($41.5) ($54.2) ($62.8) ($70.6) ($77.7)
Unlevered Net Income $67.8 $96.8 $126.5 $146.4 $164.8 $181.2
D&A $16.7 $20.3 $61.1 $28.5 $32.8 $35.3
Changes in WC ($1.7) $9.1 $37.0 $18.6 $17.8 $16.5
Capital Expenditures ($20.9) ($23.9) ($67.9) ($30.0) ($32.8) ($35.3)
Unlevered FCF $61.9 $102.3 $156.7 $163.5 $182.6 $197.7 $2,462.6
Discount Period 0.10 0.70 1.70 2.70 3.70 4.70
Discount Factor at 11.0% 0.99 0.93 0.84 0.75 0.68 0.61
Present Value of Cash Flows $12.4 $95.1 $131.2 $123.3 $124.1 $121.0 $1,507.5
Present Value of Cash Flows and Terminal Value $2,114.6
Debt
Cash $291.0
Equity Value $2,405.6 PGR 2.75%
Shares Outstanding 121.2
Equity Value per Share $19.85 Delta ($1.47)
Source: Marcus Report Exhibit 7.1.
Note: The use of Dages shares outstanding lowers Marcus valuation conclusion by $.05. The use of Dages net investment lowers Marcus 
valuation conclusion by $.03. The use of Dages tax rate lowers Marcus valuation conclusion by $1.39.
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REBUTTAL EXHIBIT 13A
Aruba Networks, Inc.   
Discounted Cash Flow
Fiscal Year Ended July 31,
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
[1] Revenue $872.0 $1,038.0 $1,235.4 $1,420.7 $1,598.3 $1,758.1 Enterprise Value Calculation
[18] Terminal Free Cash Flow $197.8
[2] EBITDA 113.6 158.7 241.8 237.8 268.3 294.3 [19] Perpetuity Growth Rate 2.75%
[3] Less: Depreciation (16.7) (20.3) (61.1) (28.5) (32.8) (35.3) [20] Future Value of Terminal Value $2,463.3
[4] EBIT 96.9 138.3 180.6 209.3 235.5 259.0
[21] Present Value of Terminal Value $1,507.9
[5] Less: Taxes (@ 30.00%) (29.1) (41.5) (54.2) (62.8) (70.6) (77.7) [22] Present Value of Free Cash Flows $607.2
[6] After Tax EBIT 67.8 96.8 126.5 146.5 164.8 181.3 [23] Enterprise Value $2,115.1
[7] Plus:  Depreciation 16.7 20.3 61.1 28.5 32.8 35.3 Equity Value Per Share Calculation
[8] Less:  Capital Expenditure (20.9) (23.9) (67.9) (30.0) (32.8) (35.3) [24] Enterprise Value $2,115.1
[9] Less:  Increase in Working Capital (1.7) 9.1 37.0 18.6 17.8 16.5 [25] Plus:  Cash & ST Inv. $291.0
[10] Unlevered Free Cash Flow 61.9 102.3 156.6 163.6 182.6 197.8 [26] Less:  Debt $0.0
[27] Equity Value $2,406.1
[11] Valuation Date 05/18/15
[12] Period End Date 07/31/15 07/31/16 07/31/17 07/31/18 07/31/19 07/31/20 [28] Shares Outstanding 121.2
[13] Discount Period 0.10 0.70 1.70 2.70 3.70 4.70 [29] Equity Value Per Share $19.85
[14] Discount Rate 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00%
[15] Discount Factor 0.99 0.93 0.84 0.75 0.68 0.61 [30] % of Value in Terminal Value 71%
[16] Percent of Cash Flow Available 20.3% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% [31] Implied Terminal EBITDA Mult. 8.4x
[17] Discounted Cash Flow 12.4 95.1 131.1 123.4 124.1 121.1
Enterprise Value Equity Value Per Share
Discount Perpetuity Growth Rate Perpetuity Growth Rate
Rate 2.25% 2.75% 3.25% 2.25% 2.75% 3.25%
10.50% $2,147.5 $2,254.4 $2,376.0 $20.12 $20.99 $21.99
11.00% $2,022.0 $2,115.1 $2,220.2 $19.09 $19.85 $20.71
11.50% $1,910.2 $1,991.8 $2,083.4 $18.18 $18.84 $19.59
Notes:  USD in millions, except per share data.  See detailed notes on following page.
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REBUTTAL EXHIBIT 13A
Aruba Networks, Inc.   
Discounted Cash Flow
[1]:  Exhibit 15.
[2]:  Exhibit 15.
[3]:  Exhibit 15.
[4] = [2] + [3]
[5] = - [4] * 30.0%.  Assume effective tax rate of 30.0% from ArubaAA0053461.xlsx
[6] = [4] + [5]
[7] = - [3]
[8]:  Exhibit 15.
[9]:  Exhibit 15.
[10] = [6]+ [7] + [8] + [9]
[11]:  See  Paragraph 6.
[12]:  Aruba fiscal year ends 7/31.
[13]:  Assume mid period discounting and valuation date of May 18, 2015.
[14]: Exhibit 18.
[15] = 1 / ( 1 + [14] ) ^ [15]
[16]:  20.3% represents percent of a year between May 18, 2015 and July 31, 2015.
[17] = [10] * [15] * [16]
[18]:  FY 2020 Line [10].
[19]: Assumed PGR of 2.75%
[20] = ( [18] * (1 + [19] ) ) / ( [14] - [19] )
[21] = [20] * FY 2020 Line [15]
[22] = Sum Line [17]
[23] = [21] + [22]
[24] = [23]
[25]:  Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, January 31, 2015, p. 3.  Sum of "Cash and Cash Equivalents" and "Short-Term Investments."
[26]:  Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, January 31, 2015, p. 3.  Aruba does not have debt.
[27] = [24] + [25] + [26]
[29] = [27] / [28]
[30] = [21] / [23]
[31] = [20] / FY 2020 Line [2]
[28]:  I use the treasury method for my options dilution calculation.  Shares outstanding as of March 5, 2015 of 108,315,234 shares from Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, 
January 31, 2015.  Schedule of options from BARC-ARU_00033967.xls at tab: “Assumptions.”
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REBUTTAL EXHIBIT 13B
Aruba Networks, Inc.   
Discounted Cash Flow with Adjusted Revenue Projections and SBC Expense Disclosed In Proxy
Fiscal Year Ended July 31,
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
[1] Revenue $872.0 $983.3 $1,108.8 $1,241.9 $1,378.5 $1,516.3 Enterprise Value Calculation
[18] Terminal Free Cash Flow $190.9
[2] EBITDA 120.1 166.3 244.8 239.4 264.9 284.5 [19] Perpetuity Growth Rate 2.75%
[3] Less: Depreciation (16.7) (20.3) (61.1) (28.5) (32.8) (35.3) [20] Future Value of Terminal Value $2,377.8
[4] EBIT 103.3 145.9 183.7 210.9 232.1 249.2
[21] Present Value of Terminal Value $1,455.6
[5] Less: Taxes (@ 30.00%) (31.0) (43.8) (55.1) (63.3) (69.6) (74.8) [22] Present Value of Free Cash Flows $609.8
[6] After Tax EBIT 72.3 102.2 128.6 147.6 162.5 174.5 [23] Enterprise Value $2,065.4
[7] Plus:  Depreciation 16.7 20.3 61.1 28.5 32.8 35.3 Equity Value Per Share Calculation
[8] Less:  Capital Expenditure (20.9) (23.9) (67.9) (30.0) (32.8) (35.3) [24] Enterprise Value $2,065.4
[9] Less:  Increase in Working Capital (1.7) 9.1 37.0 18.6 17.8 16.5 [25] Plus:  Cash & ST Inv. $291.0
[10] Unlevered Free Cash Flow 66.4 107.6 158.8 164.7 180.3 190.9 [26] Less:  Debt $0.3
[27] Equity Value $2,356.7
[11] Valuation Date 05/18/15
[12] Period End Date 07/31/15 07/31/16 07/31/17 07/31/18 07/31/19 07/31/20 [28] Shares Outstanding 121.2
[13] Discount Period 0.10 0.70 1.70 2.70 3.70 4.70 [29] Equity Value Per Share $19.45
[14] Discount Rate 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00%
[15] Discount Factor 0.99 0.93 0.84 0.75 0.68 0.61 [30] % of Value in Terminal Value 70%
[16] Percent of Cash Flow Available 20.3% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% [31] Implied Terminal EBITDA Mult. 8.4x
[17] Discounted Cash Flow 13.3 100.0 132.9 124.2 122.5 116.9
Enterprise Value Equity Value Per Share
Discount Perpetuity Growth Rate Perpetuity Growth Rate
Rate 2.25% 2.75% 3.25% 2.25% 2.75% 3.25%
10.50% $2,096.9 $2,200.0 $2,317.4 $19.71 $20.55 $21.51
11.00% $1,975.6 $2,065.4 $2,166.9 $18.71 $19.45 $20.28
11.50% $1,867.4 $1,946.2 $2,034.6 $17.83 $18.47 $19.20
Notes:  USD in millions, except per share data.  See detailed notes on following page.
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REBUTTAL EXHIBIT 13B
Aruba Networks, Inc.   
Discounted Cash Flow with Adjusted Revenue Projections and SBC Expense Disclosed In Proxy
[1]:  FY 2015 from Exhibit 15.  Assume 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020 growth rates of: 12.76%, 12.76%, 12.00%, 11.00%, and 10.00%, respectively.
[2]:  Exhibit 15.  Assume same Non-GAAP EBITDA margin as Exhibit 15, but subtracts SBC disclosed in Proxy, p. 57.
[3]:  Exhibit 15.
[4] = [2] + [3]
[5] = - [4] * 30.0%.  Assume effective tax rate of 30.0% from ArubaAA0053461.xlsx.
[6] = [4] + [5]
[7] = - [3]
[8]:  Exhibit 15.
[9]:  Exhibit 15.
[10] = [6]+ [7] + [8] + [9]
[11]:  See  Paragraph 6.
[12]:  Aruba fiscal year ends 7/31.
[13]:  Assume mid period discounting and valuation date of May 18, 2015.
[14]: Exhibit 18.
[15] = 1 / ( 1 + [14] ) ^ [15]
[16]:  20.3% represents percent of a year between May 18, 2015 and July 31, 2015.
[17] = [10] * [15] * [16]
[18]:  FY 2020 Line [10].
[19]: Assumed PGR of 2.75%
[20] = ( [18] * (1 + [19] ) ) / ( [14] - [19] )
[21] = [20] * FY 2020 Line [15]
[22] = Sum Line [17]
[23] = [21] + [22]
[24] = [23]
[25]:  Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, January 31, 2015, p. 3.  Sum of "Cash and Cash Equivalents" and "Short-Term Investments."
[26]:  Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, January 31, 2015, p. 3.  Aruba does not have debt.
[27] = [24] + [25] + [26]
[29] = [27] / [28]
[30] = [21] / [23]
[31] = [20] / FY 2020 Line [2]
[28]:  I use the treasury method for my options dilution calculation.  Shares outstanding as of March 5, 2015 of 108,315,234 shares from Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, 
January 31, 2015.  Schedule of options from BARC-ARU_00033967.xls at tab: “Assumptions.”
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REBUTTAL EXHIBIT 13C
Aruba Networks, Inc.   
Discounted Cash Flow Using 1% Lower EBITDA Margins
Fiscal Year Ended July 31,
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
[1] Revenue $872.0 $1,038.0 $1,235.4 $1,420.7 $1,598.3 $1,758.1 Enterprise Value Calculation
[18] Terminal Free Cash Flow $185.5
[2] EBITDA 104.9 148.3 229.4 223.6 252.3 276.7 [19] Perpetuity Growth Rate 2.75%
[3] Less: Depreciation (16.7) (20.3) (61.1) (28.5) (32.8) (35.3) [20] Future Value of Terminal Value $2,310.1
[4] EBIT 88.2 127.9 168.3 195.1 219.5 241.5
[21] Present Value of Terminal Value $1,414.1
[5] Less: Taxes (@ 30.00%) (26.5) (38.4) (50.5) (58.5) (65.9) (72.4) [22] Present Value of Free Cash Flows $569.3
[6] After Tax EBIT 61.7 89.6 117.8 136.6 153.7 169.0 [23] Enterprise Value $1,983.4
[7] Plus:  Depreciation 16.7 20.3 61.1 28.5 32.8 35.3 Equity Value Per Share Calculation
[8] Less:  Capital Expenditure (20.9) (23.9) (67.9) (30.0) (32.8) (35.3) [24] Enterprise Value $1,983.4
[9] Less:  Increase in Working Capital (1.7) 9.1 37.0 18.6 17.8 16.5 [25] Plus:  Cash & ST Inv. $291.0
[10] Unlevered Free Cash Flow 55.8 95.0 148.0 153.6 171.4 185.5 [26] Less:  Debt $0.0
[27] Equity Value $2,274.4
[11] Valuation Date 05/18/15
[12] Period End Date 07/31/15 07/31/16 07/31/17 07/31/18 07/31/19 07/31/20 [28] Shares Outstanding 121.1
[13] Discount Period 0.10 0.70 1.70 2.70 3.70 4.70 [29] Equity Value Per Share $18.77
[14] Discount Rate 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00%
[15] Discount Factor 0.99 0.93 0.84 0.75 0.68 0.61 [30] % of Value in Terminal Value 71%
[16] Percent of Cash Flow Available 20.3% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% [31] Implied Terminal EBITDA Mult. 8.3x
[17] Discounted Cash Flow 11.2 88.3 123.9 115.9 116.5 113.5
Enterprise Value Equity Value Per Share
Discount Perpetuity Growth Rate Perpetuity Growth Rate
Rate 2.25% 2.75% 3.25% 2.25% 2.75% 3.25%
10.50% $2,013.8 $2,114.0 $2,228.1 $19.02 $19.84 $20.78
11.00% $1,896.1 $1,983.4 $2,082.0 $18.06 $18.77 $19.58
11.50% $1,791.2 $1,867.8 $1,953.7 $17.20 $17.83 $18.53
Notes:  USD in millions, except per share data.  See detailed notes on following page.
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REBUTTAL EXHIBIT 13C
Aruba Networks, Inc.   
Discounted Cash Flow Using 1% Lower EBITDA Margins
[1]:  Exhibit 15.
[2]:  Exhibit 15. Rebuttal Exhibit 13A EBITDA Margin - 1%.
[3]:  Exhibit 15.
[4] = [2] + [3]
[5] = - [4] * 30.0%.  Assume effective tax rate of 30.0% from ArubaAA0053461.xlsx
[6] = [4] + [5]
[7] = - [3]
[8]:  Exhibit 15.
[9]:  Exhibit 15.
[10] = [6]+ [7] + [8] + [9]
[11]:  See  Paragraph 6.
[12]:  Aruba fiscal year ends 7/31.
[13]:  Assume mid period discounting and valuation date of May 18, 2015.
[14]: Exhibit 18.
[15] = 1 / ( 1 + [14] ) ^ [15]
[16]:  20.3% represents percent of a year between May 18, 2015 and July 31, 2015.
[17] = [10] * [15] * [16]
[18]:  FY 2020 Line [10].
[19]: Assumed PGR of 2.75%
[20] = ( [18] * (1 + [19] ) ) / ( [14] - [19] )
[21] = [20] * FY 2020 Line [15]
[22] = Sum Line [17]
[23] = [21] + [22]
[24] = [23]
[25]:  Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, January 31, 2015, p. 3.  Sum of "Cash and Cash Equivalents" and "Short-Term Investments."
[26]:  Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, January 31, 2015, p. 3.  Aruba does not have debt.
[27] = [24] + [25] + [26]
[29] = [27] / [28]
[30] = [21] / [23]
[31] = [20] / FY 2020 Line [2]
[28]:  I use the treasury method for my options dilution calculation.  Shares outstanding as of March 5, 2015 of 108,315,234 shares from Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, 
January 31, 2015.  Schedule of options from BARC-ARU_00033967.xls at tab: “Assumptions.”
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REBUTTAL EXHIBIT 13D
Aruba Networks, Inc.   
Discounted Cash Flow with Adjusted Revenue Projections and SBC Expense Disclosed In Proxy 
Using 1% Lower EBITDA Margins
Fiscal Year Ended July 31,
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
[1] Revenue $872.0 $983.3 $1,108.8 $1,241.9 $1,378.5 $1,516.3 Enterprise Value Calculation
[18] Terminal Free Cash Flow $180.3
[2] EBITDA 111.3 156.5 233.8 227.0 251.1 269.3 [19] Perpetuity Growth Rate 2.75%
[3] Less: Depreciation (16.7) (20.3) (61.1) (28.5) (32.8) (35.3) [20] Future Value of Terminal Value $2,245.6
[4] EBIT 94.6 136.1 172.6 198.5 218.3 234.1
[21] Present Value of Terminal Value $1,374.7
[5] Less: Taxes (@ 30.00%) (28.4) (40.8) (51.8) (59.5) (65.5) (70.2) [22] Present Value of Free Cash Flows $576.1
[6] After Tax EBIT 66.2 95.3 120.8 138.9 152.8 163.8 [23] Enterprise Value $1,950.8
[7] Plus:  Depreciation 16.7 20.3 61.1 28.5 32.8 35.3 Equity Value Per Share Calculation
[8] Less:  Capital Expenditure (20.9) (23.9) (67.9) (30.0) (32.8) (35.3) [24] Enterprise Value $1,950.8
[9] Less:  Increase in Working Capital (1.7) 9.1 37.0 18.6 17.8 16.5 [25] Plus:  Cash & ST Inv. $291.0
[10] Unlevered Free Cash Flow 60.3 100.8 151.0 156.0 170.6 180.3 [26] Less:  Debt $0.3
[27] Equity Value $2,242.1
[11] Valuation Date 05/18/15
[12] Period End Date 07/31/15 07/31/16 07/31/17 07/31/18 07/31/19 07/31/20 [28] Shares Outstanding 121.1
[13] Discount Period 0.10 0.70 1.70 2.70 3.70 4.70 [29] Equity Value Per Share $18.51
[14] Discount Rate 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00%
[15] Discount Factor 0.99 0.93 0.84 0.75 0.68 0.61 [30] % of Value in Terminal Value 70%
[16] Percent of Cash Flow Available 20.3% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% [31] Implied Terminal EBITDA Mult. 8.3x
[17] Discounted Cash Flow 12.1 93.6 126.4 117.6 115.9 110.4
Enterprise Value Equity Value Per Share
Discount Perpetuity Growth Rate Perpetuity Growth Rate
Rate 2.25% 2.75% 3.25% 2.25% 2.75% 3.25%
10.50% $1,980.5 $2,077.9 $2,188.8 $18.75 $19.55 $20.46
11.00% $1,865.9 $1,950.8 $2,046.6 $17.82 $18.51 $19.29
11.50% $1,763.8 $1,838.2 $1,921.7 $16.98 $17.59 $18.27
Notes:  USD in millions, except per share data.  See detailed notes on following page.
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REBUTTAL EXHIBIT 13D
Aruba Networks, Inc.   
Discounted Cash Flow with Adjusted Revenue Projections and SBC Expense Disclosed In Proxy 
Using 1% Lower EBITDA Margins
[1]:  FY 2015 from Exhibit 15.  Assume 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020 growth rates of: 12.76%, 12.76%, 12.00%, 11.00%, and 10.00%, respectively.
[2]:  Exhibit 15. Rebuttal Exhibit 13B EBITDA Margin - 1%.
[3]:  Exhibit 15.
[4] = [2] + [3]
[5] = - [4] * 30.0%.  Assume effective tax rate of 30.0% from ArubaAA0053461.xlsx.
[6] = [4] + [5]
[7] = - [3]
[8]:  Exhibit 15.
[9]:  Exhibit 15.
[10] = [6]+ [7] + [8] + [9]
[11]:  See  Paragraph 6.
[12]:  Aruba fiscal year ends 7/31.
[13]:  Assume mid period discounting and valuation date of May 18, 2015.
[14]: Exhibit 18.
[15] = 1 / ( 1 + [14] ) ^ [15]
[16]:  20.3% represents percent of a year between May 18, 2015 and July 31, 2015.
[17] = [10] * [15] * [16]
[18]:  FY 2020 Line [10].
[19]: Assumed PGR of 2.75%
[20] = ( [18] * (1 + [19] ) ) / ( [14] - [19] )
[21] = [20] * FY 2020 Line [15]
[22] = Sum Line [17]
[23] = [21] + [22]
[24] = [23]
[25]:  Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, January 31, 2015, p. 3.  Sum of "Cash and Cash Equivalents" and "Short-Term Investments."
[26]:  Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, January 31, 2015, p. 3.  Aruba does not have debt.
[27] = [24] + [25] + [26]
[29] = [27] / [28]
[30] = [21] / [23]
[31] = [20] / FY 2020 Line [2]
[28]:  I use the treasury method for my options dilution calculation.  Shares outstanding as of March 5, 2015 of 108,315,234 shares from Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, 
January 31, 2015.  Schedule of options from BARC-ARU_00033967.xls at tab: “Assumptions.”
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REBUTTAL EXHIBIT 13E
Aruba Networks, Inc.   
Discounted Cash Flow Using 2% Lower EBITDA Margins
Fiscal Year Ended July 31,
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
[1] Revenue $872.0 $1,038.0 $1,235.4 $1,420.7 $1,598.3 $1,758.1 Enterprise Value Calculation
[18] Terminal Free Cash Flow $173.2
[2] EBITDA 96.2 137.9 217.1 209.4 236.3 259.2 [19] Perpetuity Growth Rate 2.75%
[3] Less: Depreciation (16.7) (20.3) (61.1) (28.5) (32.8) (35.3) [20] Future Value of Terminal Value $2,156.8
[4] EBIT 79.5 117.6 155.9 180.9 203.5 223.9
[21] Present Value of Terminal Value $1,320.3
[5] Less: Taxes (@ 30.00%) (23.8) (35.3) (46.8) (54.3) (61.1) (67.2) [22] Present Value of Free Cash Flows $531.5
[6] After Tax EBIT 55.6 82.3 109.2 126.6 142.5 156.7 [23] Enterprise Value $1,851.7
[7] Plus:  Depreciation 16.7 20.3 61.1 28.5 32.8 35.3 Equity Value Per Share Calculation
[8] Less:  Capital Expenditure (20.9) (23.9) (67.9) (30.0) (32.8) (35.3) [24] Enterprise Value $1,851.7
[9] Less:  Increase in Working Capital (1.7) 9.1 37.0 18.6 17.8 16.5 [25] Plus:  Cash & ST Inv. $291.0
[10] Unlevered Free Cash Flow 49.7 87.8 139.3 143.7 160.3 173.2 [26] Less:  Debt $0.0
[27] Equity Value $2,142.7
[11] Valuation Date 05/18/15
[12] Period End Date 07/31/15 07/31/16 07/31/17 07/31/18 07/31/19 07/31/20 [28] Shares Outstanding 121.1
[13] Discount Period 0.10 0.70 1.70 2.70 3.70 4.70 [29] Equity Value Per Share $17.70
[14] Discount Rate 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00%
[15] Discount Factor 0.99 0.93 0.84 0.75 0.68 0.61 [30] % of Value in Terminal Value 71%
[16] Percent of Cash Flow Available 20.3% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% [31] Implied Terminal EBITDA Mult. 8.3x
[17] Discounted Cash Flow 10.0 81.6 116.6 108.4 108.9 106.0
Enterprise Value Equity Value Per Share
Discount Perpetuity Growth Rate Perpetuity Growth Rate
Rate 2.25% 2.75% 3.25% 2.25% 2.75% 3.25%
10.50% $1,880.1 $1,973.7 $2,080.2 $17.93 $18.70 $19.57
11.00% $1,770.2 $1,851.7 $1,943.8 $17.03 $17.70 $18.45
11.50% $1,672.3 $1,743.8 $1,823.9 $16.23 $16.81 $17.47
Notes:  USD in millions, except per share data.  See detailed notes on following page.
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REBUTTAL EXHIBIT 13E
Aruba Networks, Inc.   
Discounted Cash Flow Using 2% Lower EBITDA Margins
[1]:  Exhibit 15.
[2]:  Exhibit 15. Rebuttal Exhibit 13A EBITDA Margin - 2%.
[3]:  Exhibit 15.
[4] = [2] + [3]
[5] = - [4] * 30.0%.  Assume effective tax rate of 30.0% from ArubaAA0053461.xlsx
[6] = [4] + [5]
[7] = - [3]
[8]:  Exhibit 15.
[9]:  Exhibit 15.
[10] = [6]+ [7] + [8] + [9]
[11]:  See  Paragraph 6.
[12]:  Aruba fiscal year ends 7/31.
[13]:  Assume mid period discounting and valuation date of May 18, 2015.
[14]: Exhibit 18.
[15] = 1 / ( 1 + [14] ) ^ [15]
[16]:  20.3% represents percent of a year between May 18, 2015 and July 31, 2015.
[17] = [10] * [15] * [16]
[18]:  FY 2020 Line [10].
[19]: Assumed PGR of 2.75%
[20] = ( [18] * (1 + [19] ) ) / ( [14] - [19] )
[21] = [20] * FY 2020 Line [15]
[22] = Sum Line [17]
[23] = [21] + [22]
[24] = [23]
[25]:  Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, January 31, 2015, p. 3.  Sum of "Cash and Cash Equivalents" and "Short-Term Investments."
[26]:  Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, January 31, 2015, p. 3.  Aruba does not have debt.
[27] = [24] + [25] + [26]
[29] = [27] / [28]
[30] = [21] / [23]
[31] = [20] / FY 2020 Line [2]
[28]:  I use the treasury method for my options dilution calculation.  Shares outstanding as of March 5, 2015 of 108,315,234 shares from Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, 
January 31, 2015.  Schedule of options from BARC-ARU_00033967.xls at tab: “Assumptions.”
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REBUTTAL EXHIBIT 13F
Aruba Networks, Inc.   
Discounted Cash Flow with Adjusted Revenue Projections and SBC Expense Disclosed In Proxy 
Using 2% Lower EBITDA Margins
Fiscal Year Ended July 31,
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
[1] Revenue $872.0 $983.3 $1,108.8 $1,241.9 $1,378.5 $1,516.3 Enterprise Value Calculation
[18] Terminal Free Cash Flow $169.7
[2] EBITDA 102.6 146.6 222.7 214.5 237.4 254.2 [19] Perpetuity Growth Rate 2.75%
[3] Less: Depreciation (16.7) (20.3) (61.1) (28.5) (32.8) (35.3) [20] Future Value of Terminal Value $2,113.4
[4] EBIT 85.9 126.3 161.5 186.0 204.5 218.9
[21] Present Value of Terminal Value $1,293.7
[5] Less: Taxes (@ 30.00%) (25.8) (37.9) (48.5) (55.8) (61.4) (65.7) [22] Present Value of Free Cash Flows $542.4
[6] After Tax EBIT 60.1 88.4 113.1 130.2 143.2 153.2 [23] Enterprise Value $1,836.1
[7] Plus:  Depreciation 16.7 20.3 61.1 28.5 32.8 35.3 Equity Value Per Share Calculation
[8] Less:  Capital Expenditure (20.9) (23.9) (67.9) (30.0) (32.8) (35.3) [24] Enterprise Value $1,836.1
[9] Less:  Increase in Working Capital (1.7) 9.1 37.0 18.6 17.8 16.5 [25] Plus:  Cash & ST Inv. $291.0
[10] Unlevered Free Cash Flow 54.2 93.9 143.2 147.3 161.0 169.7 [26] Less:  Debt $0.3
[27] Equity Value $2,127.4
[11] Valuation Date 05/18/15
[12] Period End Date 07/31/15 07/31/16 07/31/17 07/31/18 07/31/19 07/31/20 [28] Shares Outstanding 121.1
[13] Discount Period 0.10 0.70 1.70 2.70 3.70 4.70 [29] Equity Value Per Share $17.57
[14] Discount Rate 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00%
[15] Discount Factor 0.99 0.93 0.84 0.75 0.68 0.61 [30] % of Value in Terminal Value 70%
[16] Percent of Cash Flow Available 20.3% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% [31] Implied Terminal EBITDA Mult. 8.3x
[17] Discounted Cash Flow 10.9 87.2 119.9 111.1 109.4 103.9
Enterprise Value Equity Value Per Share
Discount Perpetuity Growth Rate Perpetuity Growth Rate
Rate 2.25% 2.75% 3.25% 2.25% 2.75% 3.25%
10.50% $1,864.1 $1,955.8 $2,060.1 $17.80 $18.55 $19.41
11.00% $1,756.3 $1,836.1 $1,926.3 $16.92 $17.57 $18.31
11.50% $1,660.1 $1,730.2 $1,808.7 $16.13 $16.70 $17.35
Notes:  USD in millions, except per share data.  See detailed notes on following page.
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REBUTTAL EXHIBIT 13F
Aruba Networks, Inc.   
Discounted Cash Flow with Adjusted Revenue Projections and SBC Expense Disclosed In Proxy 
Using 2% Lower EBITDA Margins
[1]:  FY 2015 from Exhibit 15.  Assume 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020 growth rates of: 12.76%, 12.76%, 12.00%, 11.00%, and 10.00%, respectively.
[2]:  Exhibit 15. Rebuttal Exhibit 13B EBITDA Margin - 2%.
[3]:  Exhibit 15.
[4] = [2] + [3]
[5] = - [4] * 30.0%.  Assume effective tax rate of 30.0% from ArubaAA0053461.xlsx.
[6] = [4] + [5]
[7] = - [3]
[8]:  Exhibit 15.
[9]:  Exhibit 15.
[10] = [6]+ [7] + [8] + [9]
[11]:  See  Paragraph 6.
[12]:  Aruba fiscal year ends 7/31.
[13]:  Assume mid period discounting and valuation date of May 18, 2015.
[14]: Exhibit 18.
[15] = 1 / ( 1 + [14] ) ^ [15]
[16]:  20.3% represents percent of a year between May 18, 2015 and July 31, 2015.
[17] = [10] * [15] * [16]
[18]:  FY 2020 Line [10].
[19]: Assumed PGR of 2.75%
[20] = ( [18] * (1 + [19] ) ) / ( [14] - [19] )
[21] = [20] * FY 2020 Line [15]
[22] = Sum Line [17]
[23] = [21] + [22]
[24] = [23]
[25]:  Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, January 31, 2015, p. 3.  Sum of "Cash and Cash Equivalents" and "Short-Term Investments."
[26]:  Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, January 31, 2015, p. 3.  Aruba does not have debt.
[27] = [24] + [25] + [26]
[29] = [27] / [28]
[30] = [21] / [23]
[31] = [20] / FY 2020 Line [2]
[28]:  I use the treasury method for my options dilution calculation.  Shares outstanding as of March 5, 2015 of 108,315,234 shares from Aruba Networks Form 10-Q, 
January 31, 2015.  Schedule of options from BARC-ARU_00033967.xls at tab: “Assumptions.”
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REBUTTAL EXHIBIT 14
Aruba Networks, Inc.
Marcus Comparable Company Analysis
WLAN Vendors and Pure Plan Networking Peers
Revenue EBITDA Net Income
2015E 2016E 2015E 2016E 2015E 2016E
WLAN Vendors
Ubiquiti 3.8 3.3 11.7 9.8 16.1 13.9
Ruckus Wireless 2.1 1.8 13.8 10.5 NMF 39.5
Aerohive 1.6 1.3 NMF NMF NMF NMF
Median 2.1 1.8 12.8 10.2 16.1 26.7
Mean 2.5 2.1 12.8 10.2 16.1 26.7
Pure Play Networking
F5 Networks 4.3 3.9 11.2 NMF 25.6 22.1
Arista Networks 5.1 4.1 18.7 15.6 40.8 32.9
Radware 4.1 3.7 18.3 15.6 30 22.5
A10 Networks 1.5 1.3 NMF NMF NMF NMF
Median 4.2 3.8 18.3 15.6 30.0 22.5
Mean 3.8 3.3 16.1 15.6 32.1 25.8
PPN / WLAN Median 200% 211% 144% 154% 186% 84%
PPN / WLAN Mean 150% 152% 126% 154% 200% 97%
Median (All Peers) 3.8 3.3 13.8 13.1 27.8 22.5
Mean (All Peers) 3.2 2.8 14.7 12.9 28.1 26.2
All Peers / WLAN Median 181% 183% 108% 129% 173% 84%
All Peers / WLAN Mean 129% 130% 116% 127% 175% 98%
Source: Marcus Exhibit 8-1.
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 REBUTTAL EXHIBIT 15A
Aruba Networks, Inc.
Marcus Comparable Company Analysis
WLAN Vendors and Pure Plan Networking Peers
Revenue EBITDA Net Income
2015E 2016E 2015E 2016E 2015E 2016E
Operating Figure $872.0 $1,038.0 $119.0 $180.0 $47.0 $85.0
    Trading Multiple - Median 3.8 3.3 13.8 13.1 27.8 22.5
Business Enterprise Value $3,313.6 $3,425.4 $1,642.2 $2,349.0 $1,306.6 $1,912.5
     Less: Interest Bearing Debt
     Add: Cash $291.0 $291.0 $291.0 $291.0
Minority Interest Equity Value $3,604.6 $3,716.4 $1,933.2 $2,640.0 $1,306.6 $1,912.5
     Add: Control Premium @ 20% $720.9 $743.3 $386.6 $528.0 $261.3 $382.5
Fair Value of Equity $4,325.5 $4,459.7 $2,319.8 $3,168.0 $1,567.9 $2,295.0
     Fully-Diluted Shares Outstanding 120.9 120.9 120.9 120.9 120.9 120.9
Fair Value per Share $35.78 $36.89 $19.19 $26.20 $12.97 $18.98
Note: USD in millions. Slight differences due to rounding. 
Source: Marcus Exhibit 8-1.
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REBUTTAL EXHIBIT 15B
Aruba Networks, Inc.
Marcus Comparable Company Analysis
WLAN Vendors
Revenue EBITDA Net Income
2015E 2016E 2015E 2016E 2015E 2016E
Operating Figure $872.0 $1,038.0 $119.0 $180.0 $47.0 $85.0
    Trading Multiple - Median 2.1 1.8 12.75 10.15 16.1 26.7
Business Enterprise Value $1,831.2 $1,868.4 $1,517.3 $1,827.0 $756.7 $2,269.5
     Less: Interest Bearing Debt
     Add: Cash $291.0 $291.0 $291.0 $291.0
Minority Interest Equity Value $2,122.2 $2,159.4 $1,808.3 $2,118.0 $756.7 $2,269.5
     Add: Control Premium @ 20% $424.4 $431.9 $361.7 $423.6 $151.3 $453.9
Fair Value of Equity $2,546.6 $2,591.3 $2,169.9 $2,541.6 $908.0 $2,723.4
     Fully-Diluted Shares Outstanding 120.9 120.9 120.9 120.9 120.9 120.9
Fair Value per Share $21.06 $21.43 $17.95 $21.02 $7.51 $22.53
Source: Marcus Exhibit 8-1.
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REBUTTAL EXHIBIT 16A
Aruba Networks, Inc.
Marcus Comparable Company Analysis
WLAN Vendors and Pure Plan Networking Peers
Without Minority Discount
Revenue EBITDA Net Income
2015E 2016E 2015E 2016E 2015E 2016E
Operating Figure $872.0 $1,038.0 $119.0 $180.0 $47.0 $85.0
    Trading Multiple - Median 3.8 3.3 13.8 13.05 27.8 22.5
Business Enterprise Value $3,313.6 $3,425.4 $1,642.2 $2,349.0 $1,306.6 $1,912.5
     Less: Interest Bearing Debt
     Add: Cash $291.0 $291.0 $291.0 $291.0
Minority Interest Equity Value $3,604.6 $3,716.4 $1,933.2 $2,640.0 $1,306.6 $1,912.5
     Fully-Diluted Shares Outstanding 120.9 120.9 120.9 120.9 120.9 120.9
Fair Value per Share $29.81 $30.74 $15.99 $21.84 $10.81 $15.82
Source: Marcus Exhibit 8-1.
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REBUTTAL EXHIBIT 16B
Aruba Networks, Inc.
Marcus Comparable Company Analysis
WLAN Vendors
Without Minority Discount
Revenue EBITDA Net Income
2015E 2016E 2015E 2016E 2015E 2016E
Operating Figure $872.0 $1,038.0 $119.0 $180.0 $47.0 $85.0
    Trading Multiple - Median 2.1 1.8 12.75 10.15 16.1 26.7
Business Enterprise Value $1,831.2 $1,868.4 $1,517.3 $1,827.0 $756.7 $2,269.5
     Less: Interest Bearing Debt
     Add: Cash $291.0 $291.0 $291.0 $291.0
Minority Interest Equity Value $2,122.2 $2,159.4 $1,808.3 $2,118.0 $756.7 $2,269.5
     Fully-Diluted Shares Outstanding 120.9 120.9 120.9 120.9 120.9 120.9
Fair Value per Share $17.55 $17.86 $14.96 $17.52 $6.26 $18.77
Source: Marcus Exhibit 8-1.
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REBUTTAL EXHIBIT 17
Aruba Networks, Inc.
Summary of Meru and Ruckus Comparable Transactions
Target's Target Transaction
Announce Close Primary Transaction LTM Value / 
# Date Date Target Company Acquirer Company SIC Code Value Revenue LTM Revenue
[1] 01/22/2015 04/08/2015 Aruba Networks, Inc. HP Inc. (NYSE:HPQ) 3576 $2,651 $812 3.3x
[2] 05/27/2015 07/07/2015 Meru Networks, Inc. Fortinet Inc. (NasdaqGS:FTNT) 3661 $42 $88 0.5x
[3] 04/04/2016 05/27/2016 Ruckus Wireless, Inc. Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. (NasdaqGS:BRCD) 3576 $1,300 $392 3.3x
Source: Capital IQ. USD in millions.
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REBUTTAL EXHIBIT 18
Aruba Networks, Inc.
HP Discounted Cash Flow Analysis
2015-2020
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
NOPAT $192.0 $235.0 $231.0 $266.0 $300.0 $330.0
CapEx ($21.0) ($24.0) ($68.0) ($30.0) ($33.0) ($35.0)
Depreciation $17.0 $20.0 $61.0 $27.0 $33.0 $35.0
Change in WC ($2.0) $9.0 $37.0 $19.0 $18.0 $16.0
$186.0 $240.0 $261.0 $282.0 $318.0 $346.0
Discount Period 0.50 1.50 2.50 3.50 4.50 5.50
Discount Rate 11.99% 11.99% 11.99% 11.99% 11.99% 11.99%
Discount Factor 0.94 0.84 0.75 0.67 0.60 0.54





FV of TV $3,964.2 16% $2,240.5
PV of TV $2,126.5 17% $2,076.8
PV of Cash Flows $1,141.3 18% $1,935.3
Enterprise Value $3,267.8
Source: ArubaAA0503225. See Rebuttal Report Paragraph 52 for HP WACC Range.
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General Information
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